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APPELLATE STANDING IN BANKRUPTCY
"It is safe to say that to be a 'person aggrieved' one must be directly and
adversely affected pecuniarily by the order of the referee which is
challenged. After all, practical common sense need not be entirely divorced
from bankruptcy proceedings."-Honorable John B. Sanborn, 19621
I. INTRODUCTION
In the four decades since Judge Sanborn's common sense interpretation
of the appellate standing requirements under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,2
federal bankruptcy law has evolved considerably-so much so that many of
the common understandings and fundamental assumptions of that time have
given way to other concepts of the role and function of bankruptcy. Even
so, some elements of the process, including the application of the appellate
standing test at issue in Hartman, remain in spite of the absence of an
express statutory basis in the Bankruptcy Code.3 Over time, the pecuniary
interest requirement for appellate standing and other judicial constructions
have become so ingrained in the process that their underlying rationale is no
longer seriously questioned. However, recent changes to the Bankruptcy
Code and the strained efforts of some courts to sustain the pecuniary limit
suggest that the time to reframe bankruptcy appellate standing has arrived.
Under the 1898 Act, courts applied an express statutory distinction
between standing in summary proceedings before a referee and appeals
from orders issued in those proceedings. This distinction has no parallel in
the Code, and the interests subject to an order of the referee were far more
limited than bankruptcy court orders are today. As with Hartman and other
cases applying a pecuniary standard under the Bankruptcy Act, early
decisions extending the standard to appeals under the Bankruptcy Code
centered on matters of asset collection and distribution; it is not at all clear
that the variety of non-pecuniary interests that may arise and find resolution
in bankruptcy court today were, or even could have been, considered.
Unlike many pre-Code cases, however, modem appellate prudential
standing in bankruptcy is customarily determined by a mechanical
application of the pecuniary interest standard regardless of the nature of the
rights and interests contemplated by the relevant provisions of the Code.
At the same time, the scope of interests addressed by, and adjustments
to the operation of the bankruptcy system under the Code have greatly
1 Hartman Corp. of Am. v. United States, 304 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1962).
211 U.S.C. §§ 101-1200 (1976) (repealed 1978).
'11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2007).
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expanded the circumstances in which significant non-pecuniary interests
come into play. Some provisions do not appear to serve any party's direct
pecuniary interest, and others both address discrete pecuniary matters and
advance important non-pecuniary goals within the overall design of the
bankruptcy system. The failure to recognize protected non-pecuniary
interests and the objectives served by the involvement of those holding
these interests may have the perverse effect of undermining the integrity of
the process and encouraging manipulation of the provisions of the Code-
results that every Congress that enacted, modified, or rescinded bankruptcy
legislation throughout history sought to avoid.
I. BANKRUPTCY STANDING UNDER THE CODE
A. The Form and Function of Standing Principles and the Separation
of Powers
Standing to appear and be heard is one of the most basic requirements of
the American legal system. Nonetheless, courts and commentators may
refer to one form of standing while applying the standards for another or
indiscriminately merge discussions of standing with assessments of
underlying substantive issues.4 The confusion is understandable; the term
"standing" captures judiciability concepts that overlap at the margins, and
the analyses are often blurred.5 The standards applied may be difficult to
define with precision, and their requirements are not readily reduced to a
mere "mechanical exercise. 6 Even standards that seem reasonably precise
on the surface may prove difficult to apply consistently in practice,
particularly in light of the nature of the judicial role: a rationale that may be
4 See James C. Hill & Thomas E. Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 15-16
(1983) (noting the potential influence of the merits of the substantive question presented); accord
Baena v. KPMG L.L.P., 453 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006) (criticizing cases confusing in pari delicto
doctrine with standing).
5See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968) ("Standing has been called one of 'the most
amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law.' Some of the complexities peculiar to
standing problems result because standing 'serves, on occasions, as a shorthand expression for all
the various elements of justiciability."') (citations omitted); FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981,
988 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhe constitutional and prudential dimensions of standing must be kept
separate; when the two are fused, standing law becomes confused."); In re Godon, Inc., 275 B.R.
555, 563 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002) (noting the ambiguity of the term "standing").
6See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (prudential and constitutional standing
incorporate "concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition" and cannot be defined so
as to make its application "a mechanical exercise").
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reasonable under the facts before the court may not be adaptable to other,
perhaps unforeseen, circumstances. As one commentator noted:
The doctrine of standing is arguably the Hydra of
American jurisprudence. Confusing and constantly
changing, it has been called everything from "incoherent"
to "a word game" that is "permeated with sophistry."
Efforts to understand the standing doctrine through the lens
of any particular issue often fail for the same reason that
efforts to slay the Hydra failed: after answering one
question, two or more questions spring up in its place.
Thus, as the Greek heroes and heroines who sought to
destroy the Hydra created a worse monster, the Supreme
Court's cases seeking to clarify the standing doctrine often
create more questions than they actually answer.7
To minimize the risk of confusion, it is useful to distinguish between the
types of standing, their respective purposes, and how these purposes are
balanced against other considerations.
1. Article III Standing and the Judicial Role
The judicial power is limited under Article III of the Constitution to
consideration of "Cases" or "Controversies." 8 Of course, this limit is a
critical component of the tripartite system and a necessary element of any
case or proceeding; it may not be waived by the parties or the court. 9 As
now-Chief Justice Roberts once noted:
[I]t may be worthwhile to recall that the Supreme Court for
some time has recognized standing as a constitutionally
based doctrine designed to implement the Framers' concept
of the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society. The legitimacy of an unelected, life-
tenured judiciary in our democratic republic is bolstered by
the constitutional limitation of that judiciary's power in
Article III to actual "cases" and "controversies." The need
7Matthew R. Schulz, Recent Case, Bennett v. Spear, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683, 683 (1999)
(citations omitted).
8U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1911)
(discussing the case or controversy requirement).
9 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
2007]
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to resolve such an actual case or controversy provides the
justification not only for judicial review over the popularly
elected and accountable branches of the federal
government, but also for the exercise of judicial power
itself, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and
property of those to whom it extends. This is nothing new;
the Court explained a century ago that the exercise of
federal judicial power was legitimate only as a necessity in
the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy. 10
Consistent with this purpose, Article III standing requires an "injury in
fact," an actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest, as a
result of the challenged action that will likely be redressed by a favorable
decision." The function of the courts is, of course, to adjudicate the case
and controversy before them; judicial review is therefore interpretive and
tailored to the specific facts of the case. Deciding a dispute without an
injury or beyond the scope of the case is not adjudication; it is judicial
legislation.
2. Statutory Standing and Legislative Design
The term "statutory standing" has been used to refer to variations of
prudential standing concepts, such as the "zone of interests" covered by a
statute, " and as a subset of prudential standing generally. 13 For the sake of
clarity, this Article limits the term "statutory standing" to the right to appear
and be heard that is authorized by the express terms of the relevant statute.
By contrast, the term prudential standing refers only to the judicially-crafted
standing requirements that supplement constitutional and statutory
standing. 14
As with constitutional standing, statutory standing is a product of the
separation of powers in the federal system-it is based on the power of the
legislative branch to determine what to legislate, balance the interests
affected by a law, and design the structure for accomplishing its objectives.
l0John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220
(1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
" Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
12 Cf Jeffrey M. Goldberg & Assocs. v. Holstein (In re Holstein), 299 B.R. 211,223 (Bankr.
N.D. 111. 2003).
3 See In re Godon, Inc., 275 B.R. 555, 563-64 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002).
14 See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing prudential standing and the zone of interests test).
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A natural application of this authority is fixing who may be heard in court
concerning disputes over a statute. 15  These statutory provisions limit the
courts' discretion to unilaterally choose who has the right to be heard; the
courts do not have the authority to expand standing beyond the limits
imposed, or deny standing when it has been expressly granted, by
Congress.' 6  If the courts interpret standing in a manner contrary to
congressional intent, Congress may amend the relevant statute to clarify
that intent to ensure that the courts' role in the statutory design functions as
Congress intended. But the fact that Congress does not amend a statute in
response to judicial legislation should not be read as an endorsement by
silence. 17
'
5 See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). Statutory standing may not, however, exceed the limits of Article Ill.
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 487 n.24 (1982) ("Neither the Administrative Procedure Act, nor any other congressional
enactment, can lower the threshold requirements of standing under Art. III."); Roberts, supra note
10, at 1226 ("If Congress directs the federal courts to hear a case in which the requirements of
Article Ill are not met, that Act of Congress is unconstitutional."). Even so, this does not prevent
Congress from creating legal rights such that the Article III standing requirement is satisfied.
Roberts explained:
The Court has recognized that the requisite Article III injury may exist solely by
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing. The
Court in Defenders explained that its prior cases applying this principle were consistent
with the injury in fact requirement, because in those cases the statutes in question
elevated injuries that were not previously legally cognizable to the status of legally
enforceable rights.
Id. at 1228.
16See In re Godon, Inc., 275 B.R. at 564; cf Leuthner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ne.
Pa., 454 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 2006) (In concluding "that statutory standing requirements in
ERISA § 502(a)(1) were essentially a codification of ERISA's 'zone of interest'-we did not
mean the inverse, i.e., that prudential standing suffices for statutory standing. Indeed, it would
make little sense for Congress to have enacted ERISA § 502(a)(1) to define who may bring suit
against a plan administrator if standing to sne were to be determined by the traditional 'zone of
interest' prudential standing test."); In re J.M. Wells, Inc., 575 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1978).
17United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (noting that "[C]ongressional inaction
lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such
inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change" (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 187 (1994))); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001) ("And when, as here,
Congress has not comprehensively revised a statutory scheme but has made only isolated
amendments, we have spoken more bluntly: It is impossible to assert with any degree of
assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional approval of the
BAYLOR LA WREVIEW
3. Judicial Self-Governance and Prudential Standing
Prudential standing "is founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society"' 8 and guide
the determination of whether a party "is a proper party to invoke judicial
resolution of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers."' 9
Although the considerations may overlap, prudential standing should not be
confused with statutory interpretation or Article III standing. Statutory
interpretation focuses on the meaning of the statutory language, and Article
III standing concerns the existence of an injury in fact. Prudential standing
takes these concepts one step further: even if not a direct extension of the
statutory language or intent, courts evaluate basic questions about the party
advancing the question, the nature of the rights in question, and the
underlying purposes of the relevant statutory provisions within the context
of the separation of powers principle. Thus, the common prudential
standing considerations-"the general prohibition on a litigant's raising
Court's statutory interpretation." (quotation marks and citations omitted)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, 509 U.S. 155, 168 n.16 (1993) ("The government's reading would require us to rewrite
§ 243(h)(1) into its pre-1980 status, but we may not add terms or provisions where congress has
omitted them, and this restraint is even more compelling when congress has specifically removed
a term from a statute" (quotation marks and citations omitted)); Ark. Best Corp. v. Comm'r, 485
U.S. 212, 222 n.7 (1988) (although 25 years passed since statute was first interpreted a particular
way "without any sign of disfavor from Congress," inaction was not sufficient to overcome the
statutory language); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) ("'Few principles
of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend
sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language."'
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart,
J., dissenting))); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n. 21 (1969) ("The verdict of quiescent years
cannot be invoked to baptize a statutory gloss that is otherwise impermissible.... Congressional
inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis"); Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[W]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the
absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle."); see also Nw. Envtl. Advocates v.
U.S. E.P.A., No. 03-05760 SI, 2005 WL 756614, at *9-13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (EPA
interpretation applied for thirty years without congressional action did not establish congressional
acceptance of the interpretation).
l8 E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (prudential standards serve as rules of
judicial self-restraint that compliment constitutional standing limits on the exercise of judicial
power in the federal system).
1gBender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8 (1986) (citing Warth, 422
U.S. at 518); accord Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2005)
("The prudential standing analysis examines whether a particular plaintiff has been granted a right
to sue by the statute under which he or she brings suit." (citing City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386
F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004))).
[Vol. 59:3
2007] APPELLATE STANDING IN BANKRUPTCY
another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and
the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked" 2 0-all limit standing in ways that, directly or
indirectly, compliment the principle.21
Prudential standing is thus considered a doctrine of judicial self-
restraint, which, in this context, refers to avoiding judicial actions that
22intrude into the legislative or executive spheres. This is admittedly a
difficult line to draw in many cases. 23 While it often means restraint from
deciding matters unless necessary, the basis for restraint-respecting the
separation of powers of our federal system-may be better served by
refusing to employ judicially-crafted limits that exclude parties
contemplated by the language of the statute.24 As Justice Frankfurter noted,
20Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); accord In re A.P.I. Inc., 331 B.R. 828, 858
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (applying three-prong test of Warth v. Seldin); Sentinel Trust Co. v.
Newcare Health Corp. (In re Newcare Health Corp.), 244 B.R. 167, 171 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000)
(citing general prudential standing requirements).
21See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
22 Of course, the fact that judicial statutory interpretations may alter the understanding of a
law does not render the statutory construction a legislative activity. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) ("[U]nder the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's
characteristic roles is to interpret statutes."); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am.,
451 U.S. 77, 95 & n.34 (1981) ("[T]he federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not
the judicial, branch of government"; once the legislature speaks, "the task of the federal courts is
to interpret and apply statutory law.").
23See LC & S, Inc. v. Warren County Area Plan Comm'n, 244 F.3d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 2001)
("[T]he line between legislation and adjudication is not always easy to draw"); United States v.
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., concurring). However, the judicial
imposition of a distinct statutory process from another statute arguably suggests that the function
in question is legislative, not judicial. As Judge Kozinski argued in Koyomejian, "[B]y anybody's
definition, what the court does today falls in the realm of legislation. Any doubt on this score is
surely removed by the court's explicit and conscious adoption of its requirements from Title I. If
this is adjudication, I am a fish." Id.
24See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (courts could not adopt a
heightened pleading requirement for employment discrimination claims); Crawford-El v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574, 594 (1998) (concluding that a judicially-crafted "special [pleading] rule for
constitutional claims that require proof of improper intent ... would stray far from the traditional
limits on judicial authority"); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) (holding that court was not permitted to impose
judicially-crafted heightened pleading requirements in civil rights cases); Educadores
Puertorriquefios en Acci6n v. Hernindez, 367 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[F]ederal courts should
refrain from crafting heightened pleading standards, regardless of the special circumstances those
standards are intended to address."); GNB Battery Techs, Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 620-
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"[T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication
and legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and
instinctive, as well as trained, reluctance to do so.
'2 5
Confusion often arises, however, when discussions of prudential
standing focus on its role in promoting judicial efficiency and convenience.
To be certain, prudential standing plays an important role in judicial self-
management. But this function cannot be viewed in isolation; steps taken to
improve judicial efficiency and convenience must be consistent with the
statutory design. Although the Supreme Court has, at times, referred to
prudential standing as a tool of judicial convenience in distinguishing
prudential and other forms of standing,26 it has not condoned the exclusion
of parties for judicial convenience alone.
B. Bankruptcy Standing Today
The reach of federal bankruptcy power is such that standing
considerations are often more complex in bankruptcy cases and
proceedings 27 than in other litigation. 28 Bankruptcy operates not only to
resolve individual disputes in isolation-a context in which the impact of an
order on a specific party's interests and rights is much less difficult to
ascertain-but also to balance the respective rights of parties in interest in
the case as a whole as provided by statute. 29 An order concerning a discrete
21 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying judicial authority to impose heightened pleading requirements to
minimize litigation where a municipal immunity defense was likely); Brader v. Allegheny Gen.
Hosp., 64 F.3d 869, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1995) (rejecting heightened pleading requirement in antitrust
case).
25Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527,
535 (1947).
26 United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
557 (1996).
27 The bankruptcy case may be seen as "the basis for taking control of all pertinent interests in
property, dealing with that property, determining entitlements to distributions, the procedures for
administering the mechanism, and discharging the debtor." Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241
B.R. 896, 908 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999). By contrast, a "proceeding" refers to an isolated matter
within the bankruptcy case. Bank United v. Manley, 273 B.R. 229, 235 (N.D. Ala. 2001) ("A title
11 case is the umbrella under which all of the proceedings that follow the filing of a bankruptcy
petition take place." (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
28See Kowal v. Malkemus (In re Thompson), 965 F.2d 1136, 1141 (1st Cir. 1992).
29 As Collier notes:
[B]ankruptcy litigation in many instances is unlike ordinary civil litigation. In a typical
civil case, there is a plaintiff and a defendant, one of which loses at the trial level. It is
[Vol. 59:3
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proceeding may have a substantive impact on the bankruptcy case
and, directly or as a result of the order's impact on the case as a
whole, the interests of several distinct parties. 30  Any resulting injury,
financial or not, may constitute an "injury in fact" for Article III
purposes regardless of whether it stems from the outcome of the
proceeding in isolation or due to its impact on the entire bankruptcy
case. 31  Furthermore, these injuries may be redressed in many
instances with affirmative relief authorized under the Code or by
blocking the entry of (or, on appeal, reversal of an order granting)
relief requested by another party. In short, a large number of parties
may satisfy Article III standing requirements in a single bankruptcy
dispute.
Bankruptcy standing is not, however, without limits; far from it. Many
provisions of the Code expressly limit the right to bring actions or
otherwise be heard to specific parties. Moreover, courts may employ
general prudential standing tests that further limit the parties that are
entitled to be heard.32  The constitutionality of statutory barriers is
rarely in question, but prudential standing tests often raise questions
about the appropriate balancing of interests and the extent to which
courts may limit access to their courtrooms without legislating from
the bench.
therefore unnecessary to set strict standards regarding standing on appeal because the
person appealing is the party to the action who lost below. On the other hand,
bankruptcy litigation frequently involves and affects the interest of entities that are not
formally parties to a particular adversary proceeding or contested matter.
1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 5.06 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2007).30Issues decided in the context of a bankruptcy case regularly have considerable unintended
or unanticipated collateral consequences that may not be reversible. See Tilley v. Vucurevich (In
re Pecan Groves of Ariz.), 951 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Bankruptcy litigation.., almost
always implicates the interests of persons who are not formally parties to the litigation.").
31See Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C, Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777
(9th Cir. 1999); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 642
n.2 (2d Cir. 1988).
32 See infra Part III.
2007]
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
1. Standing in Bankruptcy Court
a. Party in Interest Standing
In many situations, specific provisions of the Code extend the
right to be heard to "parties in interest, 3 3  and, unless otherwise
specified,34 section 1 109(a) authorizes parties in interest to participate:
A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a
creditors' committee, an equity security holders'
committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any
indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard
on any issue in a case under this chapter.35
Although section 1109(a) expressly notes that "party in interest"
includes the parties listed, 36 the term is not limited to those parties 37 and is
not otherwise defined in the Code.
In the absence of a statutory definition, it is useful to understand how
the term was applied under the Bankruptcy Act.38 Indeed, although the
3311 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2) (2007) (professional compensation); id. § 362(c)(3)(B) (extend
automatic stay); id § 362(d) (lift stay); id. § 502(a) (claim objections); id. § 554(b) (abandon
property); id § 706(b) (convert case); id. § 707(b)(1) (convert or dismiss case); id. § 1104(a), (c)
(appoint trustee or examiner); id. § 1112(b) (dismiss case); id § 1121(c), (d) (file plan and
request modification to exclusive period to file plan); id. § 1128(b) (plan confirmation); id
§ 1144 (revoke confirmation); id. § 1174 (railroad liquidation); id. § 1204 (remove or reinstate
debtor in possession); id. § 1208(c), (d) (dismiss or convert case); id. § 1224 (plan confirmation);
id. § 1228(d) (revoke discharge); id § 1230(a) (revoke confirmation); id. § 1307(c) (convert or
dismiss case); id. § 1328(e) (revoke discharge); id § 1330(a) (revoke confirmation).
34See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 8 (2000)
("[W]e do not read § 1109(b)'s general provision of a right to be heard as broadly allowing a
creditor to pursue substantive remedies that other Code provisions make available only to other
specific parties."). Although the provision at issue in Hartford Underwriters allows only the
trustee to initiate a specific proceeding, the opinion does not foreclose the possibility that a party
in interest may have standing to challenge the trustee's action.
" I I U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2007). Although Chapter 7 does not include a comparable provision,
parties in interest generally have the same right to appear and be heard in Chapter 7 as they do in
Chapter 11. LeBlanc v. Salem (In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp.), 196 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1999) (noting that "Chapter 7 includes no comparable provision, but in practice bankruptcy
courts routinely entertain adversary proceedings against the Chapter 7 trustees. In light of the
structure and purposes of the Code, we agree with these courts that the right to be heard applies in
the liquidation context." (citations omitted)).
36 In addition, the recently-enacted section 1512 of the Code provides foreign representatives
with the right to "participate as a party in interest." 11 U.S.C. § 1512 (2007).
3 7See id. § 102(3) ("'includes' and 'including' are not limiting").
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Bankruptcy Act extended limited participation rights to "parties in interest"
without defining the term,39 its application was informed by the principle
that Congress legislates against its understanding of prior bankruptcy law.40
As one court explained:
The use ... of the words "parties in interest" instead of
the word "creditors" was, of course, intentional, and, as it is
presumed the legislators who framed the act of 1898 had
some familiarity with the act of 1867, it is fair to assume
that they intended to make the act of 1898 broader than that
of 1867[.]41
The need to establish a pecuniary interest depended on the nature of the
issue under consideration.42 Consistent with this understanding, courts
38 When a term is not defined under the Code, courts look to the contemporary understanding
of the term at the time the law was enacted. United States v. Schilling (In re Big Rivers Elec.
Corp.), 355 F.3d 415, 432-33 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing the Congressional inclusion of terms
from existing law when drafting the Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Code); Wright v. Bujnowski
(In re Wright), 209 B.R. 276, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (referencing legislative history and the
understanding of "willful and malicious" under the Bankruptcy Act to discern its meaning under
the Code); accord NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) ("Where Congress uses
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms."); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) ("A fundamental canon
of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." (citing Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81
(1975))). In the absence of a change in the statutory design or other clear expression of intent to
change pre-Code law, the pre-Code understanding will generally guide the application of current
law. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) (noting that Congress does "not write on a
clean slate" when it modifies bankruptcy law).
39In re Imperial '400' Nat'l, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 155, 168 (D.N.J. 1977) (discussing the
meaning of "parties in interest" under the Bankruptcy Act).
40In re Levey, 133 F. 572, 574-75 (N.D.N.Y. 1904).
411d. at 574.
42In re Feuer, 4 F.2d 892, 893 (2d Cir. 1925) (Creditor was a party in interest even though it
did not have a pecuniary interest in the discharge order); In re Levey, 133 F. at 575; In re
Imperial '400', 431 F. Supp. at 168 (refusing to limit the term to creditors and shareholders
because any party could simply purchase a right to be heard); In re Sanders, 20 F. Supp. 98, 99
(N.D. Ga. 1937) ("One who is hurt or helped by the discharge is a party in interest."); GILBERT'S
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 835 (4th Ed. 1937) (Courts interpret parties in interest to include
"every party having any interest in or connection with the case"). But see In re Sully, 152 F. 619,
620 (2d Cir. 1907) ("The term 'parties in interest' applies to those who have an interest in the res
which is to be administered and distributed in the proceeding; and does not include those who are
merely debtors or alleged debtors of the bankrupt."); FRANK 0. LOVELAND, A TREATISE ON THE
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have generally concluded that the term should be interpreted broadly under
the Code and may extend to those without a pecuniary interest.43
Party in interest standing is not static across all proceedings within a
bankruptcy case-status as a party in interest with respect to some
proceedings does not necessarily bestow the same status with respect to
other proceedings. Indeed, the legislative history expressly notes that the
definition of the term depends on the context of the dispute; a party is not a
party in interest with respect to a specific matter unless they have a
sufficient interest in that matter." This interest may, however, arise as a
result of the significance of the issue to the party's rights in the case as a
whole. Parties in interest have certain basic rights in the administration and
substantive developments in the case. Actions that forever alter a party's
rights in the case as a whole-even when the loss of those rights may not
alter the party's non-bankruptcy rights in the absence of some future
event-nonetheless give rise to an injury in fact; it cannot be seriously
questioned that the loss of the protections afforded by the Bankruptcy Code
qualifies as an injury. The preservation of these rights, then, is distinct and
personal, not a mere "generalized interest" in a case or proceeding.
LAW AND PROCEDURE IN BANKRUPTCY § 275 (3d ed., The W.H. Anderson Co. 1907)
(concluding that a pecuniary interest was required to qualify as a party in interest entitled to object
to discharge).
43See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985); Ault v. Emblem Corp. (In re
Wolf Creek Valley Metro. Dist. No. IV), 138 B.R. 610, 615 (D. Colo. 1992); In re River Bend-
Oxford Assocs., 114 B.R. 111, 116 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990) ("[T]he concept of party in interest
under the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of participation in the reorganization process should be
interpreted flexibly to insure fair representation of all significantly impacted constituencies."); In
re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The concept of 'party in
interest' is an elastic and broad one designed to give the Court great latitude to insure fair
representation of all constituencies impacted in any significant way by a Chapter 11 case."), aff'd,
52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
44See In re River Bend-Oxford Assoc., 114 B.R. at 113 (noting that absence of a statutory
definition of "party in interest" was intentional and its meaning depends on the particular purposes
of the provision in question and factual context in which it is applied) (citing 124 CONG. REC.
S17, 407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)); cf Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175-76 (1997) ("Whether a
plaintiffs interest is 'arguably... protected... by the statute' within the meaning of the zone-of-
interests test is to be determined not by reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question
(here, species preservation), but by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the
plaintiff relies.").
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b. Prudential Standing in Bankruptcy Court
The general prudential standing principles that are most often applied in
bankruptcy court overlap with, and reinforce, the "party in interest" focus
on the specific provisions at issue. For example, the zone of interests test is
commonly employed to discern whether a party's interests are protected
45
and exclude parties hoping to obtain a potential windfall from the operation
of Code provisions that are designed for the sole benefit of other parties.46
Standing in these circumstances does not advance the statutory purpose and
may lead to abuse of the bankruptcy process.47 For much the same reason,
bankruptcy standing often hinges on whether the interest that the party is
asserting is their own or that of another party.48 Thus, notwithstanding the
expansive reach of party in interest standing, the specific purposes of the
statutory provisions at issue commonly provide common sense limits on
this standing.
Other provisions of the Code provide designated parties with standing to
appear and be heard on any issue, albeit with specific limitations. For
example, section 1109(a) of the Code provides the SEC with sweeping
participation rights in bankruptcy court, but it also expressly denies the SEC
45 The zone of interests test has been characterized as "the most useful factor in considering
Congressional intent on the question of standing" and is often used for that purpose. Bonds v.
Tandy, 457 F.3d 409, 413 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201, 1209 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991)). But this application of the test is not a "prudential standing"
inquiry as that term is ordinarily defined; it is simply a means of determining whether a party has
statutory standing.
46See In re Harwald Co., 497 F.2d 443, 444 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Caldor, Inc., 193 BR. 182,
186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
47See generally Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing and the Dormant Commerce Clause:
Why the "Zone of Interests " Test Should Not Apply to Constitutional Cases, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 23
(2006) (discussing whether the zone of interests test should be applied outside of the context of the
Administrative Procedure Act). Although its application is not universal, it has been invoked to
assist with understanding congressional intent. See supra note 45. And the test has been applied
by courts interpreting the Code. Dick's Clothing & Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc., 212
B.R. 283, 289 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (citing precedent applying the zone of interest test to cases under
the Act and the Code).
48It is well-settled that a party must assert their own rights in all but very limited
circumstances. Royal Indem. Co. v. Am. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 165, 171 (1933); In re
Caldor, 193 B.R. at 186. Courts are particularly skeptical when the parties whose rights the third
party asserts have chosen not to assert their rights themselves. Travelers Cas. & Sur. v. Corbin (In
re First Cincinnati, Inc.), 286 B.R. 49, 51 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2002).
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the ability to initiate an appeal.49  Section 307 states that the United States
trustee "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in any case or
proceeding under this title but may not file a plan pursuant to section
1121(c) of this title."5 °  Likewise, the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue" in a
commodities broker liquidation under Chapter 7.51
2. The "Person Aggrieved" Test and Appellate Standing in
Bankruptcy
Although they have increasingly allowed a broad spectrum of parties to
have party in interest standing in bankruptcy court; bankruptcy appellate
panels, district courts, and circuit courts have adopted a distinct pecuniary
interest test for standing to appeal. Indeed, every circuit court to consider
the question of appellate standing under the Code has adopted a pecuniary
interest requirement, 52 which is based on the "person aggrieved" test for
standing to appeal orders of referees under section 39(c) of the 1898 Act.
4911 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2007) ("The Securities and Exchange Commission may raise and may
appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter, but the Securities and Exchange
Commission may not appeal from any judgment, order, or decree entered in the case."). In
railroad bankruptcy cases, standing is granted to regulatory authorities with the same limitation on
appellate standing. Id. § 1164 ("The Board, the Department of Transportation, and any State or
local commission having regulatory jurisdiction over the debtor may raise and may appear and be
heard on any issue in a case under this chapter, but may not appeal from any judgment, order, or
decree entered in the case."). These provisions set the parameters for standing for these parties
regardless of whether they may also qualify as parties in interest. In re Prop. Mgmt. & Inv., Inc.,
19 B.R. 202, 204 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982). Moreover, the limitations established on the right of
these parties to appeal do not extend to parties in interest that are similar to these parties. Co Petro
Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n (In re Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc.),
680 F.2d 566, 573 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Having shown itself to be a party in interest.., the
Commission should be entitled to the right of appeal normally enjoyed by such parties. The
statutory restriction of § 1109(a) against appeals by the SEC is applicable to the Commission
neither in express language nor in spirit.").
50 11 U.S.C. § 307 (2007).
511d. § 762.
52 Lyndon Prop. Ins. Co. v. Katz, 196 F.App'x 383, 387 (6th Cir. 2006); Century Indem. Co.
v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.), 426 F.3d 675, 685 (3d Cir. 2005); White v.
Univision of Va., Inc. (In re Urban Broad. Corp.), 401 F.3d 236, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2005); Gibbs &
Bruns, L.L.P. v. Coho Energy, Inc. (In re Coho Energy Inc.), 395 F.3d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 2004);
In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 214 n.20 (3d Cir. 2004); Armstrong v. Potter (In re
Potter), 101 F.App'x 770, 772 (10th Cir. 2004); Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n v. Barbee (In re
Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n), 293 F.3d 1332, 1335 (1 1th Cir. 2002); Harker v. Troutman (In re
Troutman Enter., Inc.), 286 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 2002); In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d
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Under the person aggrieved test, bankruptcy appeals are limited to those
who are "directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order., 53 Only
those with a financial stake54 in an order-whether by diminishing their
property, increasing their burdens, or impairing their rights 55-may appeal.
Most courts have held that this excludes contingent financial injury 56 or a
non-pecuniary injury that has an indirect financial impact.5 7 Regardless of
the design of the provision in question or how substantial a party's interest
may be, the absence of a clear, direct pecuniary injury resulting from an
order of the bankruptcy court will frequently bar the party's appeal.
III. ARGUMENT
A. The Need for Appellate Review under the Code
The right to appeal plays a vital role in maintaining public confidence in
the judicial process, and "the rights to sue and to defend a suit would lose
much of their meaning if losing litigants could not appeal .... ,5 This is
particularly true in bankruptcy; the impartiality of bankruptcy courts is
often called into question, and strict adherence to the statutory design may,
at times, be unduly sacrificed to expedite the administration of, or salvage, a
224, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2000); Kabro Assocs. Of West Islip, L.L.C. v. Colony Hill Assocs. (In re
Colony Hill Assocs.), 111 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1997); GMAC v. Dykes (In re Dykes), 10 F.3d
184, 187 (3d Cir. 1993); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d
636, 642 (2d Cir. 1988); Nangle v. Surratt-States (In re Nangle), 288 B.R. 213, 216 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2003); Travelors Cas. & Sur., 286 B.R. at 51.
53 Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983).
54 See Nangle, 288 B.R. at 216; Travelers Cas. & Sur., 286 B.R. at 51; In re Gulf States
Steel, Inc., 285 B.R. 739, 742 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2002).
55 See Lyndon Prop. Ins., 196 F.App'x at 387; Century Indem. Co., 426 F.3d at 685; In re
Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 214; Armstrong, 101 F.App'x 772; Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n,
293 F.3d at 1335; In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d at 249; Dykes, 10 F.3d at 187.
56See Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1995); Rogers v. Bank
of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 142 F.2d 128, 129 (9th Cir. 1944).
57Austin Assocs. v. Howison (In re Murphy), 288 B.R. 1, 5 (D. Me. 2002); Menk v. Lapaglia
(In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 917 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc. v. Pine State
Creamery Co., 200 B.R. 125, 127 (E.D.N.C. 1996). But see Am. Nuclear Insurers v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., No. CIV.A. 01-2751, 2002 WL 1334882, at *3 (E.D. La. June 14, 2002).
58Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the Right to
Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 849-50 (2003-04); cf Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Beyond Recidivism, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 343, 363 (2006) (citing the
role of "effective oversight from the appellate courts" to check bankruptcy court orders from
"get[ting] out of hand").
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case. 59 Historically, public confidence has been critical to the success or
failure of federal bankruptcy law. 60  And, politics aside, the bankruptcy
courts' perceived bias toward reorganization and expediency played a
significant part in the decision to roll back judicial discretion in the 2005
Amendments.
61
The structure of the judicial process generally also evinces
congressional recognition of the importance of bankruptcy appeals.62 The
recent addition of a process for direct appeal from bankruptcy court to
federal circuit courts, for example, highlights the importance of appellate.
review to the bankruptcy process. 63 This process is designed to promote the
consistent application of the substantive provisions of the Code by
59 LYNN M. LOPuCKi, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 137-81 (The University of Michigan Press 2005) (citing
examples); accord Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate
Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 132-33 (1998) ("To the
extent bankruptcy courts use judicial case management to substitute their judgment for that of the
interested parties, they may step beyond the bounds of impartial decision maker and into the role
of active participant in the case."); see also Arturo Bris, Alan Schwartz, & Ivo Welch, Who
Should Pay for Bankruptcy Costs?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 329 (2005) (asserting that bankruptcy
courts have a "continuation bias"); George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of
Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 46 n.40 (2000) (referencing a "pro-continuance bias
of bankruptcy courts"); Charles J. Tabb, A Critical Reappraisal of Cross-Collateralization in
Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 109, 171 (1986-87) (arguing that "bankruptcy courts have a strong
bias in favor of attempting the reorganization"). But see Robert D. Martin, Comments, 54 BUFF.
L. REV. 503, 504-05 (2006) (agreeing with Professor LoPucki that "decisions have been made
which are not well founded in law and which are beneficial to debtors" and that "the bankruptcy
law now practiced in large Chapter 11 cases bears little relationship to the statutory text" but
questioning the emphasis on bankruptcy judges' responsibility for these developments).
60 See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995) (discussing development of English and American
bankruptcy law).
61Karen Cordry & Zachary Mosner, Challenging the "Lake Woebegon Syndrome": What
Hath Congress Wrought with KERPs?, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 60 (June 2006) (noting that
many of the 2005 Amendments "display a substantial distrust of judicial discretion"); Henry J.
Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the
"Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ", 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191,
192-93 (2005) ("It is no secret that the bills' proponents sought to limit the discretion of
bankruptcy judges who, according to them, are 'not real judges."').
62 Steinman, supra note 58, at 848-49.
6328 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (2007). Of course, direct appeals also avoid the delay and expense of
first appealing to the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel.
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increasing the prospects for review by the federal circuit courts. 64
Consistency, in turn, is viewed as an important part in improving the
operation of the bankruptcy system. 65
Moreover, as the reach of bankruptcy expands, the rationale behind
deferring to bankruptcy court expertise becomes less and less compelling.
In fact, it has been argued that generalist Article III courts are better suited
to balance bankruptcy interests against non-bankruptcy interests fairly.6 6
This is not the same as asserting a bankruptcy bias; rather, it is a recognition
that courts that specialize in bankruptcy may not be as familiar with other
laws or appreciate their respective significance vis-A-vis bankruptcy.
Thus, substantive appeals not only serve to benefit the appellant; they
play a vital role in preserving public confidence in the system, promoting
consistency among lower courts, and ensuring that non-bankruptcy law and
interests are given proper consideration. Congress has not manifested any
intent to subordinate these considerations to some overarching desire to
expedite the bankruptcy process, and, to the contrary, the design of the
Code suggests that expanded participation of parties in interest was not only
intended but also expected for the proper functioning of the Code.67
Moreover, elevating haste above ensuring satisfaction of the requirements
of the Code has been cited as a significant factor in the failure of
reorganization cases under the Code.6 8
64H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 148 (2005) ("This procedure is intended to be used to settle
unresolved questions of law where there is a need to establish clear binding precedent at the court
of appeals level, where the matter is one of public importance, where there is a need to resolve
conflicting decisions on a question of law, or where an immediate appeal may materially advance
the progress of the case or proceeding.").
65 1d. at 373-535 (comments of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
66Cf Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy
Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 683-84 (2002) (arguing against the creation of Article III
bankruptcy courts of appeal due to concerns that "judges drawn from the specialized bar will not
have nor develop the breadth of vision needed to harmonize bankruptcy law with related areas of
federal and state commercial law").
67In re Bell & Beckwith, 44 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) ("Public scrutiny is the
means by which the persons for whom the system is to benefit are able to insure its integrity and
protect their rights. This policy of open inspection, established in the Bankruptcy Code itself, is
fundamental to the operation of the bankruptcy system and is the best means of avoiding any
suggestion of impropriety that might or could be raised."); accord Gitto v. Worcester Telegram &
Gazette Corp. (In re Gitto Global Corp.), 422 F.34 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing expanded right
of access to information in bankruptcy).
68See supra note 59 LoPucki, at 117; see also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why
Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1976
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B. The Imprudent Application of the Modern Person Aggrieved Test
The extension of the statutory person aggrieved test under 1898 Act is
premised on the courts' ability to fashion their own prudential standing
limits. Although the Code does not expressly bar the adoption of a
judicially-imposed pecuniary interest standard, 69 neither the Code nor the
legislative history suggests that Congress contemplated the possible judicial
extension of the former standard into the current law. In particular, two
substantial elements of the current test lack any foundation in the Code,7 °
the legislative history, or the traditional understanding of prudential
standing: (a) the distinction between bankruptcy court standing and
appellate standing; and (b) the nearly universal application of a pecuniary
interest requirement. Of course, courts may be tempted to retain familiar
practices when addressing a new and unfamiliar law, regardless of whether
it has a legal basis. 71  If the test alters a party's substantive rights or
interferes with the statutory design, 72 however, its adoption as a prudential
standard is not an appropriate exercise of judicial authority.
(2002) (noting that "speed of reorganization is significantly correlated with both plan failure and
refilling" and "[flaster reorganizations are significantly more likely to fail than slower ones").69 Indeed, this absence of an express rejection of the pecuniary interest requirement is a
frequent justification for the continued use of the standard. See, e.g., Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n
v. Barbee (In re Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n), 293 F.3d 1332, 1334-35 (1 1th Cir. 2002) ("Our
sister circuits have agreed that, although Congress did not define who has standing to appeal in the
Bankruptcy Code, no evidence exists that Congress intended to alter the definition set forth in the
prior law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898"). This rationale brings to mind another "common sense"
understanding: "[A] long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of
being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defense of custom." THOMAS PAINE,
COMMON SENSE xxvii (1776).
70See Gibbs & Bruns, L.L.P. v. Coho Energy, Inc. (In re Coho Energy, Inc.), 395 F.3d 198,
202 (5th Cir. 2004); In re Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d 190, 214 n.20 (4th Cir. 2005); Armstrong
v. Potter (In re Potter), 101 F.App'x 770, 772 (10th Cir. 2004); In re Carbide Cutoff, Inc., 703
F.2d 259, 264 (7th Cir. 1983); Nangle v. Surratt-States (In re Nangle), 288 B.R. 213, 216 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2003).
7 1 For an empirical discussion of this temptation, see Cristoph G. Paulus, Germany: Lessons
to Learn from the Implementation ofa New Insolvency Code, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 89, 90 (2001-
02) (discussing the preservation of concepts and practices from Germany's old insolvency law
under the new German law).
72 Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside
Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 450 (1998) ("The other common notion, that standing is limited
to persons with pecuniary rights, is entirely inconsistent with existing statutory law."); Ralph E.
Avery, Article III and Title 11: A Constitutional Collision, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 397, 447 (1995-
96) ("The law of standing articulated in most cases significantly limits other sections of the Code
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As an exception to the court's "virtually unflagging ' 73 obligation to
hear matters within their jurisdiction,74 care should be taken to ensure that
the exception does not swallow the rule or, at least, that it does not become
a mere tool of convenience.75 Prudential criteria must be structured
carefully to strike the appropriate balance; overly-broad standards may not
provide a sufficient level of judicial self-restraint, while narrow,
perfunctory standards risk excluding interests that a law is designed to
protect or parties whose involvement is anticipated as part of the statutory
design.76
despite the apparent congressional intention to permit the widest possible participation in the
reorganization process.").
73U.S. Tr. v. Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders (In re Zenith Elecs. Corp.), 329 F.3d
338, 347 (3d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging the "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise its
jurisdiction to hear an appeal) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)); see also Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 521 (10th
Cir. 1979) ("It is a well-settled principle of federal jurisdiction that where a federal court does not
have a discretion to accept or reject jurisdiction, if it does not have jurisdiction, it will not take it;
but it is ruled, on the other hand, that if it has jurisdiction it must take it.").
74See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 235-36 n.44 (1990)
(identifying various exceptions to the obligation to exercise jurisdiction). Exceptions with respect
to matters of state law and political questions have also been adopted. Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) ("The political question doctrine excludes from
judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch."); Smith v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing
cases that address federalism concerns as a basis for refusing to exercise jurisdiction over state law
matters); see also Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-37 (1965); Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P.,
360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959) ("This principle does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal
jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise") (Harlan, J.); County of Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) (The abstention doctrine, "under which a District
Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and
narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.");
R.R. Comm'n ofTex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.). But these exceptions
still do not suggest that courts are at liberty to simply pick and choose which matters within their
jurisdiction will be heard. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 522.
75 Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion: Standing at the Forefront of Judicial
Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1548, 1601 (1992-93) ("Critics have often accused courts of
manipulating the standing doctrine for the courts' own objectives-a dislike of the particular
plaintiff, underlying political concerns, or the desire for judicial economy. No doubt exists that
the courts effectively have used standing to restrict the number of plaintiffs attempting to enter the
courthouse door.") (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-13, at 96
(2d ed. 1988) (footnotes omitted)).
76 Chief Justice Marshall noted nearly two centuries ago:
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1. The Universal Distinction Between Standing in Bankruptcy
Court and Standing on Appeal is Based on a Misreading of the
Person Aggrieved Test under the Act
a. The Person Aggrieved Test Under the 1898 Act
Recent decisions and commentary concerning the pecuniary interest
standard might lead the casual observer to believe that the person aggrieved
test applied to any appeal under the Act.77 Section 39(c) of the Act,
however, limited the right to appeal to the persons aggrieved by a referee's
order only:
A person aggrieved by an order of a referee may, within ten
days after the entry thereof, or within such extended time as
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally
true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature
may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We
cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever
difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp
that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we
can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty. In
doing this, on the present occasion, we find this tribunal invested with appellate
jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. We
find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert one.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). Although views of federal jurisdiction have changed
significantly during the last two centuries, the distinction between the courts' and Congress'
respective discretion to avoid consideration of issues remains fundamentally the same. See infra
notes 136 and 140.
77See Gibbs & Bruns LLP v. Coho Energy Inc. (In re Coho Energy Inc.), 395 F.3d 198, 202
(5th Cir. 2004); Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n, v. Barbee (In re Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n), 293
F.3d 1332, 1334-35 (11 th Cir. 2002); Harker v. Troutman (In re Troutman Enters.), 286 F.3d
359, 364 (6th Cir. 2002); In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2000); Kabro
Assocs. of W. Islip v. Colony Hill Assocs. (In re Colony Hill Assocs.), 111 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir.
1997); Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 737, 741 (3d Cir.1995); Depoister v. Mary
M. Holloway Found., 36 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1994); Holmes v. Silver Wings Aviation, Inc.,
881 F.2d 939, 940 (10th Cir. 1989); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Mansville Corp.),
843 F.2d 636, 641-42 (2d Cir. 1988); In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 1987);
Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442-43 (9th Cir. 1983); COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, § 8001.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Somme eds., Matthew Bender 15th ed.
2007) (characterizing the pecuniary interest test as "the standard under the superseded Bankruptcy
Act").
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the court may for cause shown allow, file with the referee a
petition for review of such order by a judge and serve a
copy of such petition upon the adverse parties who were
represented at the hearing .... Upon application of any
party in interest, the execution or enforcement of the order
complained of may be suspended by the court upon such
terms as will protect the rights of all parties in interest.
78
Appeals to the circuit court or the Supreme Court under the Bankruptcy
Act tracked the rules applied to non-bankruptcy matters. 79 Thus, appeals
from orders concerning matters that fell outside the jurisdiction of the
referee-including most plenary matters8°-were not subject to the person
aggrieved test. 8' Moreover, if the district court withdrew the reference and
issued orders in a case, any appeals of those orders were subject to section
24 of the Act, which did not include any sort of pecuniary requirement, not
section 39(c).
The distinction between appeals from referee orders and other orders
may appear arbitrary. However, escalation of a matter from a referee was
more than a simple appeal to a higher authority; it removed the dispute from
the streamlined administrative process before a referee to full-scale, time-
consuming litigation before a district court sitting in bankruptcy.82 Thus,
viewed in the proper historical and statutory context, the distinction
between standing before the referee and standing to appeal was not just
some arbitrary statutory decision; it was a component of the administrative
78 Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 39(c), 52 Stat. 840, 855 (1938) (repealed 1978). In addition,
General Order XXVII, which served the role of modem-day bankruptcy rules during most of the
Act's history, provided: "When a bankrupt, creditor, trustee, or other person shall desire a review
by the judge of any order made by the referee, he shall file with the referee his petition
therefore ......
79Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 24(a), 52 Stat. 840, 858-59. If the judgment, order, or decree
involved less than $500, the appeal could be "taken only upon allowance of the appellate court."
Id. § 25(a), 52 Stat. 840, 855.
80See Weidhom v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 273-74 (1920); Matthews v. United Methodist
Church (In re Pac. Homes), 611 F.2d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1980). Although plenary matters were
not properly subject to the jurisdiction of the referee, which was limited to the district court's
summary jurisdiction, the referee could hear disputes that were plenary in nature with the consent
of all of the parties. MacDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1932).
81 Likewise, standing to appear at the trial stage under the Act was not limited by the person
aggrieved test.
82 ELIZABETH LEE THOMPSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 135-36 (Univ. of Ga. Press 2004).
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design to promote efficiency and limit the abuses that plagued previous
federal bankruptcy laws.
83
b. Application of the Person Aggrieved Test Under the
Code
In many ways, the approach to bankruptcy administration today is
consistent with the approach under the 1898 Act, but there has been
surprisingly little discussion of why Congress may have chosen against
adopting a provision similar to section 39(c) when the Code was adopted.
One possible reason is that bankruptcy courts were originally intended to
possess both summary and plenary jurisdiction,84 so the adoption of a
standard that was designed to limit appeals of summary matters was omitted
to preclude its application to plenary matters. Under this view, after the
original judicial structure of the Code was found unconstitutional, 85 this
omission may have been overlooked when the judicial structure under the
Code was revised to its current form.86 As compelling as this interpretation
may be more than twenty years later, it does not find support in the
historical record or the cases adopting a pecuniary standard.
Moreover, this rationale does not explain the expansion of the pecuniary
test's application to other courts under the Code. For example, contrary to
its application under the Act, at least one court has applied the test to an
appeal from an order of the district court following its withdrawal of the
83 1d (discussing the impact of the perception of high administrative costs and widespread
fraud under the 1867 on efforts to pass another bankruptcy law in the 1880s and 1890s); DAVID
A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW N AMERICA 27, 40
(Princeton Univ. Press 2001) (the administrative difficulties with the federal bankruptcy laws of
1800, 1841, and 1867 were a significant reason for the dissatisfaction with the laws; other than
balancing debtor and creditor interests, "the most pressing issue in the debates on the 1898 act was
costs"); ASA S. HERZOG, PROCEEDINGS OF SEMINAR FOR NEWLY APPOINTED REFEREES IN
BANKRUPTCY 7-8 (1964) (noting that the "history of bankruptcy is one of complaints about the
unnecessarily high costs of administration" and highlighting the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act of
1867 and contemporary moves to repeal the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 due to high administration
costs).
84 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53-55 (1982) (discussing
the initial design of the Code).
851d. at 87.
86Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991) ("The fact that Congress may not have
foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to
give effect to its plain meaning.").
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reference from the bankruptcy court. 8 7  It may be that courts have not
considered the distinction between appeals from bankruptcy court orders
and other appeals, but this may also suggest that the current distinction is
based on some rationale other than that supporting the distinction under the
Act.
The absence of any reference to these underlying considerations in
reported opinions further suggests that they are not a significant factor in
the adoption or expansion of the pecuniary test. Alternatively, the absence
of such discussion may reflect an implicit understanding that it is of no
moment; the courts are not ordinarily authorized to rewrite a statute: "An
omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be
judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. 88
2. The Pecuniary Test is Inconsistent with the Goals and
Purposes of the Code
a. The Emphasis on Pecuniary Interests Ignores the
Terms of the Code
The most straightforward reason for the exclusion of the person
aggrieved test is one of basic statutory interpretation: it was supplanted by
the generally-applicable party-in-interest standard. 89  The substantive and
operative provisions of the Code expressly grant broad standing rights to
parties in interest generally and other specified parties directly. This right
to appear is not limited to proceedings in bankruptcy court by the plain
language of the Code. 90 Moreover, courts interpreting the application of
71n re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying person aggrieved
test to appeal from matter heard by district court after withdrawal of the reference of the matter to
bankruptcy court).
8 8 Frankfurter, supra note 25, at 534.
89 See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Brown, 371 F.3d 814, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[C]hanges in
statutory language generally indicate an intent of Congress to change the meaning of the statute.")
(quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted); Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851
F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Where the words of a later statute differ from those of a
previous one on the same or related subject, the Congress must have intended them to have a
different meaning.").
9 0Furthermore, Title 28 does not suggest that this distinction is contemplated. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 158 (West 2005).
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section 1109(b) 91 or identical language elsewhere in the Code9 2 have
concluded that there is no basis in the statutory language to distinguish
bankruptcy court standing and appellate standing.
This view is further supported by contrasting the Code with the
Bankruptcy Review Commission's 1973 report, which expressly proposed
the adoption of a standard to replace section 39(c) of the Act.93  This
proposal contemplated a provision limiting bankruptcy standing generally
to parties that satisfied the "direct and substantial interest" test of General
Order XXVII. 94  Instead, Congress greatly expanded the participation
rights 95 of parties in interest-a term that was far less exclusionary than the
substantiality test under the Act.
91S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 227 B.R. 788, 792-93 (E.D. Tex.
1998) (interpreting this language to provide an official creditor's committee with standing to
appeal as a party in interest).
92For example, courts have interpreted 11 U.S.C.A. § 307 (West 2005), which states, in
relevant part, "The United States trustee may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in
any case or proceeding[,]" as providing the United States Trustee standing to appeal. Term Loan
Holder Comm. v. Ozer Group, L.L.C. (In re Caldor Corp.), 303 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2002)
(concluding that Congress did not intend to give the trustee "significantly greater" intervention
rights than "those granted parties in interest by virtually identical statutory language"); United
States Tr. v. Clark (In re Clark), 927 F.2d 793, 796 (4th Cir. 1991) (standing based on duty to
enforce the bankruptcy laws); Morgenstern v. Revco D.S., Inc. (In re Revco D.S., Inc.), 898 F.2d
498, 500 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying public interest standard); Ruskin v. Daimler Chrysler Servs. N.
Am., L.L.C. (In re Adkins), 307 B.R. 880, 883 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
93 H.R. DOC. No. 93-137 (1973) as reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. B. pt. 4(c)
§ 2-205(a) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Somme eds., 15th ed. Rev. 2007). As the Note to this
section explained:
Subdivision (a) is new, but it derives from the case law construing the provision in
§ 39c of the present Act that authorizes any "person aggrieved by an order of a referee"
to seek review by a judge. Former General Order XXVII authorized a petition for
review of a referee's order to be filed by a bankrupt, creditor, trustee, or other person,
but the courts have limited the right to review to a person having a direct and
substantial interest in the decision appealed from. The requirement of substantiality of
interest does not impose afinancial or pecuniary standard.
Id. app. B. pt 4(c) § 2-205(a) n. 1 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
941d. app. B. pt. 4(c) § 2-205(a) n. 1. (citation omitted).
95 The Act provided far fewer participation rights for parties in interest than the Code does
today. These matters were, for the most part, limited to investigation of the debtor. See, e.g.,
Chandler Act, ch 575, § 14(b), 52 Stat. 840, 850 (1938) (repealed 1978) (debtor examination); Id.
§ 21(k) (discovery and related rights); Id. § 39(a)(7) (bring action to preserve evidence). But see
Id. § 39(c) (seek suspension of order).
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Further, the express denial of appellate standing in other Code
provisions demonstrates that Congress intended to allow appeals by parties
in interest. 96  For example, the section immediately preceding 1109(b),
which grants broad standing rights to parties in interest without
distinguishing between standing in bankruptcy and standing on appeal,
provides that the SEC "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue
in a case under this chapter, but... may not appeal from any judgment,
order, or decree entered in the case.",97  Section 1164 confers identical
standing rights and limitations on the Department of Transportation and
other regulators in railroad reorganizations. 98 Particularly telling is the fact
that section 762 of the Code grants the SEC the same right to appear in
stockbroker liquidation cases, but it does not contain a similar limitation on
SEC appellate standing.99 These provisions not only demonstrate that
Congress knew how to provide broad standing rights in bankruptcy while
limiting those rights on appeal or in other circumstances, but they also show
that Congress would expressly do so when such a restriction was part of the
statutory design.
b. The Pecuniary Test Ignores the Expanded Scope of
Interests Contemplated By the Current Statutory
Design
Another possible explanation for the omission of a provision
comparable to section 39(c) of the Act may be found in the remaining
96 A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is '"[w]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acted intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion."' Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522
U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997) (alteration in original)); see Gildon v. Bowen, 384 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir.
2004); Revco, 898 F.2d at 500; S. Pac. Trans. Co., 227 B.R. at 793; accordIn re Hardacre, 338
B.R. 718, 723 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) ("While Congress could have used the phrase 'disposable
income' in section 1325(b)(l)(B) and thereby invoked its definition as set forth in section
1325(b)(2), it chose not to do so. Consequently, Congress must have intended 'projected
disposable income' to be different than 'disposable income."').
9' 11 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (West 2005); see also supra note 49.
9 11 U.S.C.A. § 1164 ("The Board, the Department of Transportation, and any State or local
commission having regulatory jurisdiction over the debtor may raise and may appear and be heard
on any issue in a case under this chapter, but may not appeal from any judgment, order, or decree
entered in the case.").
991d. § 762(b) ("The [Securities and Exchange] Commission may raise and may appear and
be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.").
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differences between the referee under the Act and bankruptcy court under
the Code.'00 Even after the 1984 amendments to the Code, it authorizes
broader bankruptcy court jurisdiction and addresses more substantive rights
(and, in many cases, with greater detail) than the Act.10 ' Many provisions
of the Code are designed for the primary purpose of serving decidedly non-
pecuniary interests or, at least, to elevate non-pecuniary interests over
purely pecuniary interests.'0 2 The 2005 amendments to the Code, for
example, require the appointment of consumer privacy or patient care
ombudsmen, as appropriate, to protect consumer privacy and the quality of
patient care, respectively. 103 In addition, Congress amended the Code to
address non-monetary defaults under a lease going forward, 10 4 and crime
victims are authorized to request the dismissal of a voluntary case of the
perpetrator of the crime, which will be granted when it is "in the best
interest of the victim .... ,05 Finally, many provisions of the Code play
'°Cf Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("It would
be absurd to hold that isolated portions of the Curtis Act and the Creek Agreement survive even
though the statutory context in which they appeared-allotment and assimilation-has been
stripped away by the OIWA.").
101 Howard C. Buschman III & Sean P. Madden, The Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy
Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 Bus. LAW. 913, 916 (1992) (discussing the
narrow jurisdiction of the referee under the Act and the expansion of bankruptcy court jurisdiction
under the Code); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(f); Warfield v. KR Entm't, Inc. (In re Fed.
Fountain, Inc.), 165 F.3d 600, 601 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp.
(In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619, 629-31 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing personal jurisdiction
under Code and Bankruptcy Rule 7004); Diamond Mortgage Corp. of Ill. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d
1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990); Chem. Bank v. Grisby's World of Carpet, Inc. (In re WWG Indus.,
Inc.), 44 BR. 287, 289-90 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (discussing ancillary personal jurisdiction under the
Code); In re Thomas, 315 B.R. 697, 704-06 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (nationwide personal
jurisdiction over bankruptcy petition preparers).
102 11 U.S.C.A. § 107 (balancing public disclosure and privacy interests); Id. § 112
(protection of minors); Id. § 362(b) (excepting specified criminal, enforcement and other
litigation concerning public interest concerns from the automatic stay); Id. § 365(c)(1) (barring
nonconsensual assignment of personal service and certain other contracts); Id. § 504 (fee
sharing); Id. § 523 (various exceptions to discharge based on public policy concerns); Id. § 525
(protection against pecuniary and non-pecuniary discrimination against debtors); see also Richard
F. Broude et al., The Judge's Role in Insolvency Proceedings: The View from the Bench; The
View from the Bar, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 511, 522 (2002) (noting the broad range of
social issues addressed in bankruptcy).
1'11 U.S.C.A. § 332 (consumer privacy); Id. § 333 (patient care); see also id § 351
(disposal of patient records); Id. § 704(a)(12) (patient transfer in liquidation case).
'°41d. § 365(b)(l)(A).
'
5 1d. § 707(c)(2) (emphasis added).
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multiple roles within the overall system, 106 so even provisions that address
pecuniary interests may also play a role in protecting or advancing non-
pecuniary interests. In short, even if a single pecuniary goal might have
been attributable to the 1898 Act, there is clearly no such single goal behind
the Code. 
10 7
Additionally, a significant administrative goal in enacting the Code was
to minimize litigation over jurisdictional issues that plagued the Act, 108 so it
is easy to see how provisions that create artificial procedural distinctions
could be excluded. Indeed, much like the desire to avoid consideration of
substantive disputes led to excessive litigation over the summary/plenary
distinction under the Act, the effort to avoid scrutiny of substantive issues
today may result in repeated litigation over the standing of parties in
interest.10 9 This use of prudential standing as a sword rather than a shield
106See Menk v. Lapaglia & Temecula Ready Mix, Inc. (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 914 n.58
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); accord Avery, supra note 72, at 440-42 (discussing plan confirmation
requirements and circumstances where parties with pecuniary interests ignore non-compliance).
107Martin, supra note 72, at 438-39 ("[T]here is nothing simple about bankruptcy policy or
the societal issues to which it must respond. Nor is there one goal in devising a bankruptcy
scheme. If there was, many of the current Bankruptcy Code provisions, which address a huge
array of societal concerns, would not exist."); accordToibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991)
(criticizing amici argument for assuming "that Congress had a single purpose in enacting Chapter
11").
08 ln re Seven Springs Apartments, Phase II, 33 B.R. 458, 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) ("The
elimination of controversies over the appropriate forum and the delays and expense in contesting
the existence or absence of summary jurisdiction was one of the major changes wrought by the
Reform Act."); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 46 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6007 (A "comprehensive grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts over all controversies
arising out of any bankruptcy or rehabilitation case would greatly diminish the basis for litigation
ofjurisdictional issues which consumes so much of the time, money, and energy of the bankruptcy
system and those involved in the administration of debtors' affairs."); S. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5803 ("A major impetus
underlying this reform legislation has been the need to enlarge the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court in order to eliminate the serious delays, expense and duplications associated with the current
dichotomy between summary and plenary jurisdiction .. "); Paul P. Daley & George W. Shuster,
Jr., Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 3 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 383, 386 (2005) (The broad
jurisdictional grant to bankruptcy courts "was intended to eliminate the pervasive litigation over
jurisdiction that occurred under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 by creating an independent
bankruptcy court possessing broad jurisdictional power over all matters related to a bankruptcy
case.").
'
09See Ronald Barliant et al., From Free-Fall to Free-For-All: The Rise of Pre-Packaged
Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 441, 468 (2004) (noting how asbestos "pre-
pack" plan proponents use standing in conjunction with other activities to avoid judicial scrutiny
into potentially collusive deals).
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may, in some cases, increase the demand on judicial resources rather than
reduce it." 0 Moreover, to the extent that a court engages in a full analysis
of the substantive dispute, the time and resources used to consider standing
disputes is arguably wasted.
c. The Translation of Non-Pecuniary Rights into
Financial Terms Further Demonstrates the
Limitations of the Pecuniary Test
The inequities and operational problems resulting from the one size fits
all approach have occasionally led courts to adopt ad hoc exceptions to the
standard"' or simply disregard the test altogether for the purposes of the
given case." 2 These judicial responses are not only inconsistently applied;
they also highlight the inherent limitations of the current system: The
emphasis on the pecuniary or non-pecuniary nature of the interest is
arbitrary and fails to address the significance or relevance of the interests
with respect to the specific provisions at issue. As one commentator
explained:
10 This precise rationale has been advanced by courts to authorize interlocutory appeals in
bankruptcy. In re Market Square Inn, Inc., 978 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1992) ("To avoid the waste
of time and resources that might result from viewing discrete portions of the action only after a
plan of reorganization is approved, courts have permitted appellate review of orders that in other
contexts might be considered interlocutory.") (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
Murray v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Pan Am Corp.), 16 F.3d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1994).
"' Century Indem. Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.), 426 F.3d 675, 685 (3d
Cir. 2005) (analyzing standing under the pecuniary interest test before determining that standing
was justified to preserve the integrity of the process). A similar rationale has also been the basis
for recognizing losing bidder standing to contest fraudulent or collusive public sales under 11
U.S.C.A. § 365. Kabro Assocs. of W. Islip, L.L.C. v. Colony Hill Assocs. (In re Colony Hill
Assocs.), 111 F.3d 269, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Harwald Co., 497 F.2d 443, 444-45 (7th
Cir. 1974). In Congoleum, the Third Circuit also recognized attorney standing to raise ethical
violations. 426 F.3d at 686. In addition, although contingent pecuniary interests are often
insufficient, the possibility that an estate may ultimately be solvent is often sufficient to give a
Chapter 7 debtor standing. In re Andreuccetti, 975 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
debtors had standing to challenge the settlement of the estate's right to sue various entities,
debtors had standing to appeal settlement of the estate's right to sue other parties because "[tihe
outcome of this litigation could potentially have a huge effect on the liabilities of the [debtors] and
could give them a substantial surplus upon emerging from bankruptcy"); Caldwell v. Armstrong,
342 F.2d 485, 488 (10th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Marlar (In re Marlar), 252 B.R. 743, 749 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2000).
112 See, e.g., Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774,
778 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that the reasoning behind allowing standing to those whose pecuniary
interests are affected by an order "applies equally to intangible assets").
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A strictly pecuniary approach is certainly tidy, black and
white, and easy to apply. Like many rules with these
attributes, however, it is arbitrary and incoherent. It grants
the right to be heard to those with claims, regardless of
size, and leaves those without that type of right with no
voice at all. "13
Thus, in order to preserve their rights, parties are forced to translate
their injuries into financial injuries, which may be attenuated or fail to
capture the injuries' significance. Some administrative orders, for example,
may play a decisive role in a case and how a party's interest will be treated,
but the emphasis on pecuniary rights may preclude standing even when the
order clearly injures the party's interests. 114  Similarly, workers may not
suffer a direct or immediately measurable financial loss due to an action
under section 363 that reduces safety at a worksite, but it is difficult to
argue that they lack an interest in ensuring that a safe working environment
is preserved. Likewise, a landlord may not suffer a direct financial loss
when a lessee fails to comply with non-pecuniary lease provisions, but
these provisions may be designed to prevent a range of problems and are
expressly recognized by section 365 of the Code. Thus, with the continued
application of the pecuniary interest test as a general standard, a party and a
right expressly identified by the Code would not be recognized for standing
purposes on appeal.
Even those legal or practical interests that may be readily calculated in
financial terms, such as financial rights or obligations that are contingent on
a future event, are often dismissed.' This is true even when they would
113 Martin, supra note 72, at 461; cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and
Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 75 (1984) ("A
more complex calculus [for standing in administrative appeals] could be misapplied more easily;
it would reduce the capacity of appellate courts to correct summarily all perceived errors by the
lower federal courts in nontraditional lawsuits. With all its costs, however, complexity should be
preferred to the ossification of judicial forms-especially when those forms may be unsuited to
evolving needs of the legal and political culture.").
1
4 See, e.g., OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., No. 06-167(JNE), 2006 WL 1473004, at
*5-6 (D. Minn. May 25, 2006) (concluding that appellant lacked standing to appeal denial of
party in interest standing by the bankruptcy court); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. U.S. Tr. (In re Victory
Mkts.), No. 95-CV-1619, 1996 WL 365675, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) (mem. op.)
(applying person aggrieved test to appeal of order denying request for appointment to official
committee).
115See Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1995); Rogers v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 142 F.2d 128, 129 (9th Cir. 1944).
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have a sufficient pecuniary interest if the contingency already occurred.
Under this standard, a party may be denied standing because its financial
interest is contingent, even though they may be bound by that order if the
contingency occurs while the bankruptcy case is still pending. Thus, by
accident or design, a debtor with the ability to influence the timing of a
contingency may manipulate this fact for the sole purpose of preventing a
party from being heard. 
1 16
Although the relative balancing of pecuniary and non-pecuniary rights
requires far more attention than it can be given in this Article, a clear
method of balancing these interests is not required; it is sufficient to
recognize that some non-pecuniary interests are not readily reduced to
pecuniary terms without improperly minimizing their significance. This
fact has been implicitly recognized by the adoption of provisions in the
Code that elevate non-pecuniary interests that may not be readily
quantifiable above purely financial interests.
3. Neither Bankruptcy nor Prudential Principles Authorize the
Expansion of a Statutory Standing Requirement from Prior
Law
a. The "Pre-Code Practices Doctrine " Does Not
Support the Judicial Imposition of the Pecuniary
Interest Test
Historical practice plays a substantial role in guiding our understanding
of bankruptcy law today. This recognition, as reflected in the "pre-Code
practices doctrine," has not been expressly identified as a basis for the
adoption of the pecuniary interest requirement. However, in the absence of
a clear explanation of the legal foundation for the standard, we are forced to
review potential, but unspoken, rationale for its application. And, among
the potential legal justifications, this doctrine appears to be closer to
reflecting the stated reasons for the judicial adoption of the current standard
than other theories.
116 For example, as Judge Barliant notes, the recent wave of asbestos "pre-pack" bankruptcy
cases allow the proponents to avoid certain protections of the Code, in part, because the debtors'
insurers-whose funds are expected to fund the asbestos trusts formed under the plan-are denied
standing; their only pecuniary interests are their contractual obligations under the debtors'
policies, which remain contingent on whether the claims fixed and approved by the bankruptcy
process are covered by the applicable insurance policies. Barliant, supra note 109, at 468.
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Regardless of any superficial resemblance to situations in which the pre-
Code practices doctrine has been applied, the similarities fade quickly under
anything more than a passing glance. First, the pre-Code practices doctrine
is one of limited application 1t 7 and is relevant only if a practice was
demonstrably widespread under the Act.1 18 Even if the person aggrieved
test qualifies as a pre-Code practice (as opposed to a pre-Code statutory
requirement) for the purposes of this doctrine, the current test is, at most,
only partially informed by the pre-Code test: as noted previously, the
pecuniary requirement was not universal in scope or applied to appeals
other than those from an order of the referee under the Act. 119
In addition, a practice based on a statutory provision that has no
counterpart in the current law is not the sort of historical practice
contemplated by this principle. 120  To the contrary, the removal of the old
provision from the statute ordinarily suggests that the practice that arose
from interpretation of that provision is no longer supported. 121 Courts may
not, under the rubric of prudential standing or otherwise, ignore the
conscious choice by Congress to omit the person aggrieved standard and
impose that standard by judicial fiat.' 22  As explained in Hartford
Underwriters:
"'Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 461-62
(1998) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the "significant changes in both the substantive and
procedural laws of bankruptcy" and opining that it "makes little sense to graft onto the Code
concepts that were developed during a quite different era of bankruptcy practice" (quoting United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989))).
"lSee Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 10 (citing Ron
Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 246; Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992); Kelly v. Robinson,
479 U.S. 36, 46 (1986)).
119See supra Part II.B.I; infra Part II.B.3.b.
120 Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 11 (past practice is relevant only "to fill in the details
of a pre-Code concept that the Code had adopted without elaboration" (emphasis added)). In
other contexts, the Supreme Court has held that the plain command of a statute should be given
effect "even if doing that will reverse the longstanding practice under the statute and the rule."
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (citation
omitted); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) ("[A]ge is no antidote to clear
inconsistency with a statute .. "); Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of
Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 58-66 (2006)
(discussing the "pre-code practices doctrine"); accord supra notes 38-41.
12 1 See supra notes 88 and 96.
122 See Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) ("What the government asks is not a
construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted,
presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends
the judicial function."); Trevan v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 69 F.3d 520, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
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[W]hile pre-Code practice informs our understanding of the
language of the Code, it cannot overcome that language. It
is a tool of construction, not an extratextual supplement.
We have applied it to the construction of provisions which
were subject to interpretation, or contained ambiguity in the
text. Where the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code's text is
itself clear ... its operation is unimpeded by
contrary... prior practice. 
123
This limitation on past practice is reflected in several opinions covering
a wide range of matters under the Code. 1
24
("[W]e must enforce the statute as written and are not free to ignore what appears to have been a
conscious choice by Congress" to omit particular language); Blackwell v. Vir. Dep't of Taxation
(In re Blackwell), 115 BR. 86, 88-89 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990) ("[C]ourts are not permitted to add
words to a statute or to accomplish the same result by judicial interpretation"); see also Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 510 (1986) ("We have previously
expressed our unwillingness to read into unqualified statutory language exceptions or limitations
based upon legislative history unless that legislative history demonstrates with extraordinary
clarity that this was indeed the intent of Congress." (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984))).
123 Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 10 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (ellipses in
original) (emphasis added).
124See, e.g., Staiano v. Cain (In re Lan Assocs. XI, L.P.), 192 F.3d 109, 117-18 (3d Cir.
1999) (noting that although trustees were compensated differently for "normal administration" and
reorganization under the Act, the Code does not distinguish between the two and, accordingly, the
compensation for trustees regardless of type of case); McCuskey v. Cent. Trailer Servs., Ltd., 37
F.3d 1329, 1334 (8th Cir. 1994) (statutory tolling of preference actions under a provision of the
Act was not included in the Code; thus, the pre-Code practice with respect to that provision was
abolished by Congress and does not provide guidance in interpreting the Code); D-1 Enters., Inc.
v. Commercial State Bank, 864 F.2d 36, 38-40 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that the process under the
Act may have made some proceedings resjudicata with respect to separate litigation between the
parties, but changes to process under the Code render resjudicata inapplicable); II1.-Cal. Express,
Inc. v. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. (In re II1.-Cal. Express, Inc.), 72 B.R.
987, 991 (D. Col. 1987) (debtor was authorized to take actions in the ordinary course of business
without court approval under the Code; the Act's prior approval requirement was not continued
under the Code); Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1990) (rejecting the 'no harm, no foul' doctrine developed under the Bankruptcy Act because it
does not reflect the fact that exempt property becomes property of the estate under the Code).
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b. Prudential Standing Principles Do Not Support the
Judicial Imposition of the Pecuniary Interest Test
Although it is well-settled that "Congress legislates against the
background of [the Court's] prudential standing doctrine,"' 125 this assumes
an established prudential doctrine at the time of passage. As noted
previously, the person aggrieved requirement was statutory prior to the
repeal of the Act, not prudential. 26  The pecuniary test for bankruptcy
appeals was not an extension of common prudential standing standards; it
was an interpretive standard that, at most, tracked the rationale of the zone
of interests test in order to discern the statutory meaning of "person
aggrieved." Whatever it may tell us about congressional intent under the
Act, superimposing this standard today tells us nothing about congressional
intent with respect to a particular provision of the Code.
Even if the prudential standing backdrop contemplated by Congress
somehow included knowledge that courts would continue to apply the
person aggrieved standard after its repeal, the current test is not an
extension of the established person aggrieved standard under the Act. The
term "person aggrieved" was not defined in the Act127, and General Order
XXVII did not expressly require a pecuniary interest to appeal an order of
the referee. 128 Early decisions interpreting section 39(c) focused more on
the right to appeal interlocutory orders 29 and, after the Chandler Act in
1938, whether appeals were timely filed. 130 The few reported cases to focus
on the meaning of "person aggrieved" recognized that a party could be
aggrieved by not only financial injuries but also non-pecuniary injuries.
Likewise, General Order XXVII was widely interpreted as merely requiring
a direct interest in the specific subject matter of the issue.131 Moreover, as
125Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997).
126 See supra Part II.B.
127See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1200 (1976) (repealed 1978).
1
28See supra note 78.
129See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. v. Corbin (In re First Cincinnati, Inc.), 286 B.R. 49, 52-53
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2002); Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177
F.3d 774, 778-79 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 913
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999).
130 See, e.g., Pfister v. N. I11. Fin. Corp., 317 U.S. 144 (1942).
1311n re Henry Wood Sons Co., 279 F. 608, 608 (D. Mass. 1922) ("While that order [General
Order XXVII] does not in express terms limit the right of review to parties having an appealable
interest in the subject-matter of the petition for review, it has been so understood and construed.").
2007]
BAYLOR LA WREVIEW
noted earlier, the current application of the standard to all appeals is not
consistent with practice under the Act. 132
In spite of this history, most contemporary discussions of the person
aggrieved standard assume that it consistently required a pecuniary interest.
This assertion is supported by sweeping statements such as Judge Sanborn's
"common sense" application of the standard in Hartman.33 These cases,
however, assumed that only pecuniary rights were contemplated under the
Act and often ignored whether the specific provisions at issue were
designed solely to protect pecuniary interests. To that end, notwithstanding
the language that was used, they do not stand for the proposition that all
appeals in bankruptcy should be governed by a pecuniary test. 134 Indeed,
this is precisely the sort of generalization that Chief Justice Marshall
cautioned against misreading years ago:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection
with the case in which those expressions are used. If they
go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very
point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is
obvious. The question actually before the Court is
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are
considered in their relation to the case decided, but their
possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely
investigated. 135
13 2 See supra Part II.B.a.
133See Hartman Corp. of Am. v. United States, 304 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1962).
'
3 4 Cf Office of Commc'n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-01
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.) (concluding in a communications law context that "courts have
resolved questions of standing as they arose and have at no time manifested an intent to make
economic interest and electrical interference the exclusive grounds for standing").
.
35 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399-400 (1821). Justice Jackson, writing for a
unanimous court, mirrored this sentiment more than a century later:
It is timely again to remind counsel that words of our opinions are to be read in the light
of the facts of the case under discussion. To keep opinions within reasonable bounds
precludes writing into them every limitation or variation which might be suggested by
the circumstances of cases not before the Court. General expressions transposed to
other facts are often misleading.
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c. The Modern Person Aggrieved Test is Inconsistent
with Prudential Standing Principles
As previously noted, prudential standing at its core is a principle of
judicial restraint. Although the pecuniary test applied under the Act, like
the prudential standards employed at the bankruptcy court level today,
advanced the purposes of the specific provisions of the Act to which the test
might be applied, the modem test for bankruptcy appellate standing is often
applied where it does not serve any such purpose and, to the contrary,
arguably conflicts with legislative intent. 136 Indeed, most discussions of the
need for this test focus exclusively on the judiciary's desire to limit
bankruptcy appeals. 137 The Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded that the
standard:
[E]xists to fill the need for an explicit limitation on
standing to appeal in bankruptcy proceedings. This need
springs from the nature of bankruptcy litigation which
almost always involves the interests of persons who are not
formally parties to the litigation. In the course of
administration of the bankruptcy estate disputes arise in
which numerous persons are to some degree interested.
Efficient judicial administration requires that appellate
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1944); see also Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of
Fort Smith, 163 F.3d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 1998); accord United Gas Improv. Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co.,
381 U.S. 392, 404 (1965) (noting that the reference to "leases" in a prior opinion "should not be
taken to cover more than the particular kind of leases that were before the Court; it should not be
considered as embracing each and every transfer that can be put in lease form.").
136 As explained in, Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:
When Congress has conferred standing, it matters not one iota if a large number of
people share the injury and would benefit from its redress. The courts may
appropriately function as the guardians of majority interests, without weakening the
separation of powers, when Congress has decided to grant them that role. Indeed, far
from preserving the separation of powers, when Congress has spoken, the courts place
themselves in conflict with the legislative branch if they ignore the statutory message.
793 F.2d 1322, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Davis ex rel Davis v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth.,
121 F.3d 92, 105 (3d Cir. 1997) (Cohen, J., dissenting) (adopting prudential standing criteria to
alter the balance struck by Congress is "precisely what the prudential standing requirements were
designed to obviate").
137See, e.g., Cult Awareness Network, Inc. v. Martino (In re Cult Awareness Network), 151
F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998).
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review be limited to those persons whose interests are
directly affected. 
138
Under this view, the imposition of a pecuniary interest requirement
provides an important limiting function. As the Seventh Circuit explained:
If we except the Cult Awareness Network from the
pecuniary interest rule, it is unforeseeable how many other
exceptions would have to be made for other debtors with
substantial but nonpecuniary interests. We see no logical
reason to make an exception for a debtor with a Lanham
Act interest and not a debtor with an antitrust concern, or
an environmental concern, or any one of countless other
important but nonpecuniary concerns. Our bankruptcy
system works because it processes debtors and their
creditors in, we hope, an expeditious manner. Making
exceptions would complicate the process unnecessarily. As
the Fourth Circuit stated: Courts consistently have noted a
public policy interest in reducing the number of ancillary
suits that can be brought in the bankruptcy context so as to
advance the swift and efficient administration of the
bankrupt's estate. This goal is achieved primarily by
narrowly defining who has standing in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 1
39
In other words, the public policy of expediting bankruptcy
administration justifies the refusal to consider public policy and other non-
pecuniary interests that may be affected. But there is no basis in common
law, the separation of powers doctrine, or the Code for courts to refuse to
review appeals for the singular purpose of limiting their judicial burden.1 40
138 Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441,443 (9th Cir. 1983).
139 Cult Awareness Network, 151 F.3d at 609. In that case, the debtor attempted to challenge
the sale of its trade name to an organization that it believed to be a cult. Id. In any case, it is
doubtful that the debtor would have standing under the party in interest test either. The debtor,
having turned over the assets of its estate, surrendered any financial, legal, or practical rights it
had in the trademark upon its voluntary conversion to a chapter 7 liquidation case.
140Cf Smith, supra note 75, at 1607 (criticizing opinion "guided by [the judge's] desire to
limit the judiciary's role, as well as his belief that granting standing to this plaintiff would open
the floodgates for more plaintiffs to claim this injury in the future" as an "abdicat[ion of] his
responsibility to review a case in which the plaintiffs were properly before the court."). A mere
benefit to judicial economy does not justify the intrusion into the legislative function. See
generally Magill v. State Employees' Ret. Sys. of Ill. (In re Lyons), 957 F.2d 444, 446 (7th Cir.
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This is particularly true for bankruptcy appellate panels, whose raison
d'.tre is to hear bankruptcy appeals.
It is also doubtful that the assumption behind this justification-that a
massive spike in bankruptcy appeals will occur in the absence of the
pecuniary requirement-has merit. This fear is based, at least in part, on
the concern that anyone can contest and appeal any issue in a case as long
as they are parties in interest with respect to any other issue in the case. As
noted previously, status as a party in interest with respect to some
proceedings does not necessarily bestow the same status with respect to
other proceedings. Indeed, the legislative history expressly notes that the
definition of the term depends on the context of the dispute; a party is not a
party in interest with respect to a specific matter unless they have a
sufficient interest in that matter. 
141
Moreover, if judicial burden alone is a sufficient reason to adopt a
particular standing test, any arbitrary test can serve the same purpose. The
fact that it is nominally based on a former statutory test is the classic
distinction without a difference in this case. The requirement that a debtor
be a merchant or be insolvent, as was the case under some prior federal
bankruptcy laws, would reduce case loads far more than the person
aggrieved test, but nobody is suggesting that the judiciary could resurrect
these limitations. Whether or not courts applying judiciability doctrines in
this fashion are "betraying Chief Justice John Marshall's legacy and
1992) (although contrary to goal of efficiency, a court cannot accelerate the distribution of
debtor's retirement contributions contrary to the limits of the Code); Calvert v. Bongards
Creameries (In re Schauer), 835 F.2d 1222, 1227 (8th Cir. 1987) ("the goal of administrative
convenience must bow to a superior principle [in this case, the principle that bankruptcy does not
create new substantive rights in property]"). Cf Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
514-15 (2002) ("Whatever the practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules do not contain
a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits. A requirement of greater
specificity for particular claims is a result that 'must be obtained by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation."') (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)); In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 451,459 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
4 1 The focus of the party in interest inquiry must be on "the particular purposes of the
provision in question." See 124 Cong. Rec. S17419 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
DeConcini); see also id at H 11102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). These
purposes may be limited to narrowly-focused, discrete matters or involve a broad range of
considerations in the case as a whole. See infra, Section III.A.
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violating the principles of the Constitution they had sworn to protect",1 42
they have crossed the line between adjudication and legislation.
C. Current Problems in Application of the Person Aggrieved Test:
The Asbestos Cases
One area in which judicial policymaking is striking is in the recent wave
of pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcy cases. The overwhelming burden of
asbestos litigation and the lack of congressional action have encouraged
courts to salvage these deals between asbestos personal injury attorneys and
defendants, even if doing so requires the approval of plans of questionable
validity and, at best, uncertain benefit to the victims of asbestos exposure.
This retreat into the recesses of equity-such that prudential standing is
applied and employed to the extent necessary to alternately preserve suspect
deals, on the one hand, and strike down deals that, in the courts' eyes, have
gone too far on the other-slips away from the limits and bounds of judicial
discretion outlined by the Code. However admirable the goal, a brief
survey of just two of these cases demonstrates the problems of such an
approach and reinforces Sir Edward Coke's admonition that talis discretio
discretionem confundit. 143
1. In re Combustion Engineering, Inc. 144
In In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., the debtor and its parent
"communicated with several key players in the world of asbestos litigation
to facilitate the design and implementation of a pre-pack plan. .... 14' The
debtor, its corporate parent, key asbestos plaintiffs counsel, and a "futures
representative" selected by these parties devised a "pre-packaged" plan,
under which pre-petition claimants that participated in a pre-filing "Master
Settlement Agreement" were to receive a percentage of their claims from a
142 Smith, supra note 75, at 1615; accord United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 551
(9th Cir. 1992) ("That we are, for all intents and purposes, shielded from the rigors of the
adversary process and Supreme Court review counsels more caution, greater restraint, a more
thorough explanation of what we are doing and why. The majority's summary adoption of a code
of procedure for video surveillance and its unskeptical deference to the rationale of other circuits
is, I respectfully suggest, not consistent with the responsibility that devolves upon us as a court
established under Article III of the Constitution.") (Kozinski, J., concurring).
14'Roughly translated, "such a discretion confounds discretion." See SIR EDWARD COKE,
THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, Part V (Rooke's Case) (1605).
'"In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004).
141Id. at 204.
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pre-petition trust. The remaining "stub claims" could be pursued in
bankruptcy and would allow claimants settling under the MSA to retain
creditor status (which would allow them to vote on the plan). Under the
plan, all asbestos personal injury claims against the debtor (including stub
claims) would be channeled to a post-petition trust, which, along with the
debtor, would have the exclusive right under the plan to allow asbestos
personal injury claims asserted against the trust.
The plan contemplated that insurance policies with a face value of more
than $400 million would provide a substantial portion of the funding for the
post-petition trust. The insurers were not, however, allowed to supervise or
review the claim approval process or participate in a meaningful way in the
pre- or post-petition talks between the debtor, asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys
and the futures representative. Likewise, some asbestos plaintiffs referred
to as the "Certain Cancer Claimants" were dissatisfied with the process and
the proposed treatment of their claims. In light of these facts and the
structure of the plan and pre-petition settlement, the insurers and Certain
Cancer Claimants raised numerous objections to the plan, including:
" the issuance of an injunction under section 105(a) in favor of
non-debtor affiliates with asbestos liabilities that were unrelated
to the asbestos claims against the debtor violates section 524(g)
and addresses rights and property that are outside the court's
jurisdiction and beyond the court's equitable power under
section 105(a);
* the tiered treatment of claims depending on participation (and
timing of that participation) in the MSA gave rise to preferences
and fraudulent transfers; and this treatment violated various
provisions of chapter 11 and section 524(g) of the Code;
" the manufacturing of "stub claims" constituted artificial
impairments designed to circumvent section 1129(a)(10)'s
oversight function and establish a false "indicia of support"
required to bind future claimants to the plan under section
524(g);
* the manipulation of voting and disparate treatment of claims




* the debtor's stock contribution did not comply with the
requirements of section 524(g) because the debtor had no
significant ongoing operations.
The bankruptcy court approved the parts of the plan that fell within its
core jurisdiction and issued proposed findings of fact concerning non-core
issues. 146
The plan included a "super-preemptory provision" that purportedly
preserved "the insurers' legal, equitable or contractual rights".
147
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court concluded that the insurers could not
vote on the plan.148 On appeal, the district court concluded that the insurers
"lacked standing to appeal or object to Plan confirmation because their
'pecuniary interests [were] not directly or adversely affected' by the
Plan."' 149 The district court did not distinguish between matters in its core
and non-core jurisdiction, including its decision to limit the scope of the
super-preemptory provision to preserve the insurers' "claims." 
150
On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that insurers had limited
standing to contest the district court's modification of the super-preemptory
provision and, ultimately, concluded that the modification was an
impairment of the insurers' rights. 151 Yet the court also concluded that the
insurers lacked standing as persons aggrieved to appeal other aspects of the
district court's order. 152  This was largely academic, however, because
nearly all of the objections raised by the insurers were also raised by the
Certain Cancer Claimants, whose pecuniary interests were deemed
sufficient to give them standing. 1
53
146In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 510 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Because the Plan
included a channeling injunction under section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, the District Court
was required to affirm the Bankruptcy Court's Proposed Findings and Conclusions before the Plan
could go into effect."). To the extent that 524(g) requires the involvement of the district court, it
may be argued that the matter has already been removed from the bankruptcy forum by law, so the
person aggrieved test should not apply to any appeal concerning that section. See supra Part
II.B.1.a.
147 Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 209.
14810d.
1491d. at 216.
ISOSee In re Combusion Eng'g, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Del. 2005).
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The Third Circuit's opinion with respect to the merits of the objections
largely mirrors the assertions of the insurers and Certain Cancer
Claimants. 154  The panel rejected the third-party injunction issued under
105(a), and it found numerous faults with the two-tier settlement and plan
structure. 155 In sum, the court concluded that the plan was not confirmable
due to its multiple violations of the protections intended by the Code,
including the protections intended for future claimants under section
524(g). 156 The panel's opinion reveals that the court readily saw past the
scheme to manufacture an illusion of compliance with the Code while
circumventing its protections.
For the purposes of this paper, the extent to which the plan proponents
in Combustion Engineering may have flouted the Code is secondary to the
fact that a plan with so many fundamental violations of the spirit and terms
of the Code would have survived-thereby fundamentally altering the
litigation posture of the current claimants, debtors, insurers and future
claimants-had the plan proponents simply "bought off' the Certain Cancer
Claimants as well. 157 In that case, contrary to what our mothers told us, two
wrongs would have made a right or, at least, allowed a wrong to avoid
scrutiny on appeal. Yet this is precisely what the pecuniary interest focus
encourages: Paying those creditors who make noise to be quiet and go
away, while those without the ability to raise their concerns or with only
non-pecuniary interests are forced to take whatever the plan proponents feel
like giving them. 
158
2. Century Indemnity Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum
Corp.) 159
In Century Indemnity Co. v. Congoleum Corp., we find many of the
same parties that were involved in Combustion Engineering. 160 This time,
however, the proponents engaged representatives of "cancer claimants"
1541d. at 239-47.
.
5 Id. at 235-47.
'
56 1d. at 234-35.
15 7 The practice of "buying off" vocal creditors is hardly a new one; however, this reference is
not intended to imply that the Certain Cancer Claimants would have accepted a deal of this sort.
158 See Avery, supra note 72, at 435 ("The cost of participating in a bankruptcy proceeding is
simply too high for the vast majority of creditors in bankruptcy cases.").
159Century Indem. Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.) 426 F.3d 675 (3d Cir.
2005).
160 Id.; Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d at 190.
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before finalizing a pre-petition settlement.1 61 Moreover, the original plan
did not include a super-preemptory clause and, in fact, contained provisions
that expressly bound insurers to the plan.1 62 To that end, the insurers were
ultimately granted standing in bankruptcy court to contest, among other
things, the retention professionals and the plan. 
63
Early in the case, a group of insurers objected to the retention of the
debtor's proposed "special insurance counsel," Gilbert Heintz & Randolph,
based on the ties between that firm and one of the leading asbestos personal
injury plaintiffs' attorneys, Perry Weitz. '64 Gilbert Heintz had, in fact, been
recommended to the debtors by Weitz (who also suggested that the
company pursue a "pre-pack" bankruptcy), and the two had fee-sharing
agreements in place in other asbestos bankruptcy matters. 65 Among the
shared clients in one of these cases were two clients that Gilbert Heintz
settled (on behalf of Congoleum) for $16 million before moving forward
with the bankruptcy planning. 166 The bankruptcy court ultimately approved
the retention under section 327(e), and the insurers appealed to the district
court
167 and, subsequently, to the Third Circuit. 168
As in Combustion Engineering, the plan proponents in Congoleum
responded to the insurers' objections by asserting that they lacked standing
as persons aggrieved. 69  The panel acknowledged that the persons
aggrieved test applies in bankruptcy, but distinguished Congoleum from
Combustion Engineering on the basis that the latter was an appeal from a
confirmed plan while the instant case was an "appeal from an order which
will affect the fairness of the entire bankruptcy proceeding, including the
determination of issues such as those for which we granted insurer standing
to challenge a final order in Combustion Engineering."'' 70  Likewise, the
attorneys' responsibilities to report ethical violations (as asserted against




16 5 1d. at 690.
1
6 6 1d. at 689 n.15.
1
67 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order, noting that the insurers, as the
primary source of payment, "have every interest in making it, to put it bluntly, difficult to confirm




7 1d. at 685 ("The retention of Gilbert as special insurance counsel will affect the resolution
of issues that may directly affect the rights of insurers and fairness to the asbestos claimants.").
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Gilbert Heintz in this matter) provided independent grounds for standing. 171
The court further explained:
We note also, as a practical matter, that in
circumstances such as those present here, it is highly
unlikely that any of the parties other than the insurers or
their attorneys would challenge the application for retention
of Gilbert. Congoleum, Gilbert, Perry Weitz and Joseph
Rice worked together to negotiate the terms of the pre-
packaged plan and all were deeply committed in having it
approved. Moreover, we are aware that the standard set out
in Travelers is a jurisprudential and not a strict statutory
requirement for standing. We are persuaded that, in the
circumstances here, the insurers and their attorneys have
standing to present this appeal. 1
72
Thus, the preservation of the integrity of the process justified looking
past the "jurisprudential" pecuniary interest requirement.
The problem in Congoleum is not that the court failed to consider the
pecuniary interest test; indeed, the court acknowledged the test and asserted
that the insurers' interests in the bankruptcy case were sufficient to give
them standing. Rather, the court never clearly defined what those pecuniary
interests-if any-were with respect to the insurers, and the absence of a
qualifying pecuniary interest with respect to their attorneys is all but
conceded. Notwithstanding circuit precedent that suggests otherwise,
173
perhaps the issues were sufficient to overcome prudential limits that are
ordinarily considered, but it is also clear that the translation of these
interests into pecuniary interests would have required an application of the
pecuniary test that is far more inclusive than Third Circuit precedent to
1711d
172Id. at 687; see also Kabro Assoc. of W. Islip, L.L.C. v. Colony Hill Assoc. (In Re Colony
Hill Assoc.), 111 F.3d 269, 274 (3d Cir. 1993) (allegation of attempt by debtor and creditor to
chill bidding "would call into question the 'intrinsic fairness' of the sale hearing" and noting that
"when collusion occurs between a debtor, creditors and a successful bidder, the unsuccessful
bidder may be the only party with an interest in exposing such inequitable conduct").
173 But see Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Dykes (In re Dykes), 10 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir.
1993) ("A court employs standing doctrines when it refuses to consider a legal claim on the
ground that, even though the claim may be meritorious, the litigant advancing it is not properly
situated to raise it before the court. The focus is on the party, not the claim itself. The
requirement of standing focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court
and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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date. Moreover, perhaps the most commonly-referenced opinion
supporting the extension of the pecuniary interest test-In re Fondiller-
involved the same question: whether a party without a pecuniary interest in
a retention order had standing to appeal. 174  In short, in bypassing the
pecuniary analysis, the panel implicitly recognized the imperfections of the
pecuniary interest requirement and demonstrated the need to reframe
appellate standing in bankruptcy.
The panel's rationalization that Congoleum involved "an order which
will affect the fairness of the entire bankruptcy proceeding" 75 rings hollow,
since it is difficult to understand how plan objections that go to the heart of
the "fairness" of the process as a whole provide any less reason to refuse to
be bound by the pecuniary test. Indeed, in a section 524(g) case, the
fairness and integrity of the process is essential given the impact on future
claimants' rights. 176 This justification is not based on the specific injury to
any individual's substantive financial or legal rights; it focuses on every
party's right to a fair process.177 Moreover, given that many cases are now
managed by debtors in possession instead of independent trustees, 178 parties
without direct pecuniary interests may, in some circumstances, be the only
parties with an interest in advancing these and other objectives of the
Code. 179 These objectives are no less important than managing the courts'
17 4 See Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442-43 (9th Cir. 1983).
175 Congoleum, 426 F.3d at 685.
176 See id. at 693-94.
177See Talcott v. Friend, 179 F. 676, 681 (7th Cir. 1909) (party in interest could object to
discharge under the Act even though the fraud was committed against another party).
178See Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners v. BT/SAP Pool C Assocs. (In re Coltex Loop Cent.
Three*Partners), 138 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1998) (with many cases now administered by the debtor
in possession, "the former protections against self-dealing afforded by trustee and bankruptcy
judge control are no longer present").
17 9 The United States Trustee is intended to serve an oversight role, but its ability to fill this
role is far from uniform across regions and has drawn criticism. See McGuirl v. White, 86 F.3d
1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although Congress has given the United States Trustee authority to
monitor applications for compensation and reimbursement, the Trustee is not obligated to do so,
and perhaps because of insufficient resources, the Trustee's system of review is generally
inadequate." (citations omitted)). Likewise, the presence of official committees and other officials
is no panacea. These representatives often serve multiple competing interests that may be better
served by refusing to press a motion or objection. Other officials serve discrete functions within
the case that are not well-suited to identifying and advancing other considerations.
[Vol. 59:3
APPELLATE STANDING IN BANKRUPTCY
dockets, particularly where questions of abuse, fraud and other impropriety
are at issue. 180
Finally, the Combustion Engineering panel's emphasis on the super-
preemptory clause as ensuring that insurer rights are fully preserved ignores
the factual, practical, and procedural circumstances and consequences of the
potential outcomes of coverage litigation. As an initial matter, it is difficult
to imagine that a confirmed bankruptcy plan will have no legal or factual
impact on how events unfold in coverage litigation. Even assuming the trial
court is willing to accept that the confirmed plan has no legal significance
on the posture of the parties, courts are highly unlikely to completely ignore
the practical impact of denying asbestos claimants compensation (in this
case, by denying the asbestos trust access to its primary source of funding).
Indeed, a compelling case can be made that such extra-legal considerations
were significant factors in the asbestos litigation explosion. 181
If insurers prevail in coverage litigation, and are thereby not required to
fund the asbestos trust, it is the height of nalvet6 to conclude that this would
be the end of the story. To the contrary, history again demonstrates that in
the face of a financial shortfall, a new wave of litigation will most likely
result. 182 Moreover, ignoring obvious conflicts of interest and other actions
that raise questions about the inherent fairness of the process only invites
litigation from those who become ill in the future and increases the
likelihood that their challenges will be successful. Thus, rather than
conserving judicial resources, allowing a largely untested 524(g) plan to go
into effect (and potentially fail due to inadequate controls or otherwise)
would place a greater burden on judicial resources in the long term.
'80 Indeed, many of the recent amendments to the Code were designed for the express purpose
of preventing fraud and abuse. H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(1), at 47 ("S. 256 is intended to improve the
bankruptcy system by deterring abuse .... ).
181 See generally John A. Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 990 (1995); see also Richard 0. Faulk, Dispelling the Myths of Asbestos Litigation:
Solutions for Common Law Courts, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 945 (2003); Victor E. Schwartz &
Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended Consequences in Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts
to Streamline the Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 MISS. L.J. 531 (2001).
182Cf Findley v. Trs. of the Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Trust (In re Joint E. & S. Dists.
Asbestos Litig.), 237 F. Supp. 2d 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the extensive litigation
history of the Manville Trust since its insolvency); Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies:
The Who, the Why and the How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 109 (2004) (discussing potential
litigation concerning underfunded asbestos trusts).
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IV. THE RETURN TO COMMON SENSE: CASE-SPECIFIC INTEREST
DETERMINATIONS AND PRUDENTIAL STANDING
As noted previously, prudential standing "is founded in concern about
the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society."' 183 Traditional prudential standing principles address this concern
by weeding out marginal parties with merely incidental injuries without
imposing narrow and unyielding mechanical standards. Case-by-case
judgment calls necessarily involve consideration of a variety of factors-the
statutory design, the nature of the party's interest, the potential injury to
those interests, and whether the party's contribution will advance the
purposes of the law just to name a few. Parties must raise their own rights,
and these rights must fall within the scope of interests that the statutory
provisions at issue are designed to protect, directly or as part of the
bankruptcy case. These principles avoid encroaching on the functions of
the other branches of government by not only denying standing to marginal
parties but also by recognizing the standing of parties whose interests or
participation are contemplated by the statute. If applied properly, they
provide a sufficient check against excessive litigation without sacrificing
the rights of those with a significant stake in a case or proceeding.
Further, in the absence of intrusion into the legislative or executive role,
the balance should tilt in favor of review. The greatest problems faced by
the bankruptcy system today are not ones of excessive oversight; to the
contrary, many of these problems-including the lack of consistency in
applying the Code, high reorganization failure rates, and high
administrative fees-are symptomatic of the excessive emphasis on speed
and demand more oversight and guidance, not less. As one commentator
noted:
The high costs of administration of bankruptcy cases
may stem, at least in part, from the fact that there often is
no adversarial sharpening of the issues; therefore, costs are
higher than they would be if resolved in a true case or
controversy context. By placing an undue premium on
negotiation, the Code deprives the courts of their traditional
tools for making sound judgments. Hence, confirmed
chapter 11 and chapter 13 plans are unlikely to be
183 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975).
[Vol. 59:3
APPELLATE STANDING IN BANKRUPTCY
performed, the professional fees to create them swell, and
the system fails to achieve its ends in a myriad of ways. 184
Parties that know in advance that they must be able to demonstrate that
their actions are consistent with the Code will be less likely to play fast and
loose with its protections, and additional guidance from controlling
authorities will help clarify how parties can devise plans that comply with
the Code. Moreover, as bankruptcy continues to expand into more aspects
of our personal and professional lives, the supervision of less specialized
Article III judges becomes even more critical. The time and expense of
bankruptcy cases are clearly an important consideration, but we must inject
some "common sense" into the process if we are to ensure that more and
more of our values and our quality of life are not swept aside as being
irrelevant non-pecuniary interests whenever a bankruptcy intervenes.
Rather than another arbitrary test, what follows are some basic
considerations that are common to prudential standing generally or may
help guide the development of the party in interest standard. Part statutory
interpretation and part prudential understanding, these guidelines may not
be a final, definitive answer to who should have standing across issues, but
they demonstrate that a bankruptcy system without one narrow, yet
overarching, prudential standard for appeals is hardly a chaotic one. To the
contrary, a system in which parties in interest are authorized to appeal
unless the Code expressly provides otherwise better reflects to statutory
design and reduces the risk of fraud and abuse.
A. Discerning the Scope of Interests Protected
An important element of the party in interest standard is its recognition
of the distinct, often varied interests served by individual sections of the
Code. 1 85 Many provisions of the Code are designed to serve a specific
purpose for the benefit of a limited group of parties, and the prohibition on
asserting the rights of others ensures that appeals concerning these matters
remain limited. Moreover, in contrast to the arbitrary pecuniary standard,
the party in interest requirement emphasizes the case-by-case balancing of
interests as part of the analysis:
The determination [of whether a party is a party in interest]
also calls for a delicate balancing of competing
184See Avery, supra note 72, at 448-49.
"'
85 See infra Part I.B. 1.a.
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considerations. On the one hand, courts and commentators
have recognized that the term should be broadly construed
so as to allow all parties affected by a chapter 11
proceeding to be heard, yet, as one court noted, "overly
lenient standards may potentially over-burden the
reorganization process by allowing numerous parties to
interject themselves into the case on every issue, thereby
thwarting the goal of a speedy and efficient
reorganization .... Granting peripheral parties status as
parties in interest thwarts the traditional purpose of
bankruptcy laws which is to provide reasonably expeditious
rehabilitation of financially distressed debtors with a
consequent distribution to creditors who have acted
diligently." 
186
Applying the party in interest standard to appeals is consistent not only
with the statutory language but also with the direct and substantial interest
requirement that is regularly applied in other contexts and to appeals from
district courts to courts of appeal under the Act.187 As Professor Martin
reasoned:
There are several reasons to take a broader approach to
standing. First, as discussed above, the statute clearly
permits courts to grant standing more freely and may even
require it. Second, other federal courts do not limit
standing to those with pecuniary interest. To have standing
in other courts, one must have only a direct and substantial
interest; the injury need not be financial or the resulting
obligation immediately due and payable. Nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code itself modifies this standard ....
Regardless of the precise standard adopted, standing in
bankruptcy need not rest on the existence of a financial
interest. 188
6Peachtree Lane Assocs. v. Granader (In re Peachtree Lane Assocs.), 188 B.R. 815, 824-25
(N.D. I11. 1995) (quoting In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 850-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989)) (citations omitted).
18 See, e.g., Am. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Baddock (In re First Colonial Corp. of Am.), 544
F.2d 1291, 1296 (5th Cir. 1977); Edell v. Di Piazza, 345 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965).
188 See Martin, supra note 72, at 458-59.
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In addition, the emphasis on viewing the purpose of a provision
separately and as part of the overall statutory scheme provides a more well-
rounded understanding of how the provision should operate. The critical
question in this analysis is whether the appellant has a direct and substantial
interest in the issue, regardless of whether this interest stems from the
specific matter in isolation or as part of the case generally. In turn, this
understanding provides a framework for considering whether a party's
interest in the proceeding or case, collectively or separately, is sufficient to
require representation. This two-part assessment may allow more parties to
be heard, but it may also reveal limitations on standing that are part of the
overall statutory design.
1. Proceeding-Specific Interests
The emphasis on case-by-case determinations, of course, will require
greater consideration of the specific provisions of the Code and how they
interrelate with the rest of the Code. But this is no more than statutory
analysis injected with a straightforward assessment of the interests served
by participation. Adequate protection under section 361, for example, is
intended to protect a distinct set of parties that varies depending on what
they hope to protect. If another party in interest believes the solution to be
wasteful, they must demonstrate that their interests are substantial and
directly implicated. If not, then they must establish that the impact on their
interests within the case is sufficient to make them more than a mere
marginal party to the proceeding.
To be clear, this is not to say that the pecuniary interest test should be
discarded in its entirety. It may be much easier to understand the dynamic
when a provision is clearly designed to protect a specific, narrow pecuniary
interest and the pecuniary interest test can play an important role in
discerning what interests fall within the zone of interests of that provision.
But it should be just that-one test designed to assist with the consideration
of standing where only pecuniary interests are protected. The problem lies
with holding to the erroneous view that this narrow standard is relevant to
any interests represented or issues that arise in a case or proceeding.
2. Case-wide Interests
It is critical to recognize at the outset that there is a distinction between
interests in ensuring that the law is followed and interests in maintaining the
integrity of the process. While the two overlap at times, the latter is limited
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to those whose substantial rights or interests may be modified by the case
and, accordingly, should have a voice in those matters with case-wide
significance. Regardless of the pecuniary or non-pecuniary nature of a
party's interests, the requirement that the process be fair and equitable, for
example, is the same: There is no statutory or policy justification for
allowing the fraudulent or collusive alteration of non-pecuniary interests but
not pecuniary interests.
All proceedings have some effect on the bankruptcy case. And section
1109(b) does not distinguish between status as a party in interest in the case
as a whole and as a party in interest with respect to specific proceedings.
But it is only where the proceeding may injure the party's interests (and
those interests are not otherwise adequately represented) that interest in a
case should afford a party standing with respect to a specific proceeding. 189
After all, a party in interest must still demonstrate an injury to satisfy
Article Ill-an actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest-
that will be remedied by the requested relief. An attenuated interest linked
to a specific proceeding only by reference to the interest in the case as a
whole seems, at best, a stretch of imagination where the proceeding has
only a limited impact on the case. Conversely, when an action is significant
in the context of the larger case, then the invasion of such a party's interests
is far less difficult to discern.
In addition, there are some aspects of the process that are designed to
protect the rights of all parties in interest and ensure that the Code is not
manipulated to circumvent its protections. Some actions within a case
necessarily have a significant impact on the case as a whole and include
safeguards that protect multiple interests in the case. As already noted,
prudential standing should not be a barrier where there are supportable
allegations of fraud, abuse or other impropriety because these speak to the
very integrity of the process. Likewise, provisions designed to punish
improper activities may serve parties in interest indirectly by deterring
improper actions, but once they occur, the statute only serves this purpose if
these actions in fact result in punishment. Thus, the refusal to consider the
matter based on the mistaken view that a party was not harmed in itself
causes injury to the parties in interest in the case. These elements all look
to the process rather than second-guessing decisions within the business
judgment of the debtor in possession or trustee. And the court's refusal to
adjudicate these issues in the name of prudence turns prudential standing on
189See supra Part III.A.2.
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its head; prudent adjudication is just that-adjudication-where the Code
contemplates judicial oversight.
B. Assertion of Other Parties 'Rights
Of course, the prohibition on asserting other parties' rights is well-
grounded in bankruptcy as it is in other areas of law. But care should be
taken to ensure that a party's interest in the case generally is not mistaken
for asserting another party's interest in the proceeding specifically. A party
that challenges the retention of the trustee's attorney does so not to protect
the trustee's interests in having a disinterested attorney but to protect its
own interest in the preservation of the integrity of the process. Likewise, if
a right granted by the Code will be impaired by a proceeding, the fact that a
party may not yet need to exercise that right to protect its interests (i.e.,
because it is contingent or other potential means for protecting those
interest exist) does not change the fact that the party has a distinct, personal
interest in preserving that right.
C. Standing and Balancing of Interests
The conclusion that a party has standing to be heard under this analysis
does not require any substantive balancing of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
interests. In many cases, this balancing is already fixed in the statute. The
right to assume a lease under section 365, for example, comes with the
condition of going-forward compliance with non-pecuniary conditions of
the lease regardless of the financial benefit of ignoring those conditions. In
other circumstances, balancing is not required because of the nature of the
inequitable action-a process that is tainted by fraud or collusion is not
cleansed by the fact that some parties in interest may benefit from the
inequitable process. Even where a balancing of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary interests may be required, this balancing of interests is a question
of substantive rights under the statute; it is not one of standing.
V. CONCLUSION
The policies and structure of federal bankruptcy law, as well as the
necessary conditions for appellate standing in bankruptcy, have changed
dramatically since the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act. Unfortunately, they
have been moving in opposite directions. Even as Congress continues to
expand the scope of non-pecuniary interests protected by the Code, federal
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courts continue to restrict the rights of the parties asserting these interests to
be heard on appeal.
The superficial references to prudential standing and interpretive
principles, as well as selective references to the standard to appeal referee
orders under the 1898 Act, do not support the current pecuniary interest
requirement; to the contrary, the "practical common sense" assessment of
these references suggests that the current formulation of the pecuniary
requirement unduly limits the right to be heard. The standard far exceeds
the scope of, and narrows the right to be heard far more than, its statutory
predecessor. The judicial restoration of a standard Congress chose to omit
from the Code is not supported by reference to the past practices or
prudential standing doctrines. And the base assumption that the absence of
this test will result in an unmanageable number of appeals is not only
unsupported, it ignores the structural safeguards of the Code and the
significant limits that a case-by-case application of traditional prudential
standards would provide.
By refusing to hear appeals that are properly before them, courts have
effectively written out protections provided by the Code for the singular
purpose of reducing their caseload. Ironically, the failure to guide lower
courts in the name of judicial economy has, in some cases, sparked
considerably more litigation. The judicial imposition of the pecuniary
interest standard, as opposed to any other standard, is not grounded in any
statutory or other cognizable legal authority or principle. It advances no
statutory purpose and is not guided by separation of powers principles. At
most, it is a policy conclusion that non-pecuniary interests should take a
back seat to judicial convenience. Under the circumstances, the refusal to
hear a party is not prudential judicial restraint; it is judicial legislation by
inaction and contrary to the fundamental purpose of the prudential standing
doctrine.
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